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MR. JUSTICE BRANDEIS AND THE CONSTITUTION
ALPHEUS

T.

MASONt

Long before he came to the Supreme Court, Louis Dembitz Brandeis
had emphasized the law's need of social and economic intelligence. With
prophetic insight he foreshadowed many of the challenging problems which
confront our world today, and devised "social inventions" to cope with
them. There was hardly a phase of economic, industrial and social life to
which he did not turn his hand; labor, trusts, railroads, insurance, finance
are but part. So he brought to the Court an unequalled wealth of experience in such matters, and a new. technique in dealing therewith, infinitely
valuable to the Court and the country at large.
His liberal views on social and economic issues and his methods of
approach, were already well known. His ideas on public questions, no less
than his methods of brief-making, ran absolutely counter to the smug, conventional constitutionalism of the American bar. Thus there was obvious
danger in appointing to the highest Court a man so thoroughly grounded in
the intricacies and complexities of modern business; a man who looked at
industrial problems from the point of view of the public and of the employee; and one, moreover, who would probably continue to press on beyond the bounds of legal technicality and judicial precedent to the realms
of fact and reality. The fears of those who on these grounds opposed his
appointment were proved genuine.
Shortly after his elevation to the Supreme Court, that body considered the now famous Employment Agency case,' in which its five to four
decision overturned a Washington state statute prohibiting employment
agencies taking fees from workers. The state had argued that the private
tA. B., i2o, Dickinson College; A.M., Ph.D., 1923, Princeton University; Associate
Professor of Politics at Princeton University; Author of ORGANIZED LABOR AND THE LAW
(1925) ; contributor to numerous legal periodicals.
'Adams v. Tanner, 244 U. S. 590, 37 Sup. Ct. 662 (1916).
(799)
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employment agency was "economically . . . nonuseful, if not vicious, because it compels the needy and unfortunate to pay for that which they are
entitled to without fee or price, that is, the right to work". 2 Although such
placement costs could well be met by the employer, Mr. Justice MKcReynolds demurred, applying for the Court the principle that legitimate and
useful businesses, when attended by abuses, may be regulated; while obnoxious and vicious businesses can be prohibited and destroyed. His conclusion that private employment agencies are of the former type was
reached, characteristically enough, by recourse to judicial precedents, with
no examination whatever into the evils attending this business in the state
of Washington or anywhere else.
In a strong dissenting opinion, Mr. Justice Brandeis minces no words
regarding the inadequacy of the Court's treatment of the question at issue.
Comparatively little space is given to precedents, and much of it is devoted
to showing that no correct decision can be reached by reasoning from past
cases. He absolutely denied the authority of the courts to set aside social
legislation "unless, in looking at the matter, they can see that it 'is a clear,
unmistakable infringement of rights secured by the fundamental law' .
Whether a measure relating to the public welfare", he continues, "is arbitrary or unreasonable, whether it has no substantial relation to the end proposed, is obviously not to be determined by assumptions or by a priori reasoning. The judgment should be based upon a consideration of relevant
facts, actual or possible-Ex facto ius oritur. That ancient rule must prevail in order that we may have a system of living law." 3
In accordance with the technique he had developed ten years earlier
in argument before the Supreme Court,4 it was necessary in this case, he
thought, to make the following inquiries: "What was the evil which the
people of Washington sought to correct? Why was the particular remedy
embodied in the statute adopted? And, incidentally, what has been the experience, 'if any, of other states or countries in this connection?" 5
None of these questions is raised by Mr. Justice McReynolds and,
as far as one can judge from his opinion, no official investigation of these
matters might ever have been made. Mr. Justice Brandeis, on the other
hand, gathered his materials from official reports of the United States
Bureau of Labor, the United States Commission on Industrial Relations,
and the writings of acknowledged experts. Such pertinent and easily available sources revealed evils of far-reaching effect--extortionate fees, discrimination, misrepresentation as to conditions of work and terms of employment, fee-splitting with foremen, and so on.
Ibid. at 594, 37 Sup. Ct. at 664.
'Ibid. at 599, 37 Sup. Ct. at 666.
'See Mason, Mr. Justice Brandeis: A Student of Social and Economic Science (1931)
79 U. OF PA. L. REv. 665.
' Adams v. Tanner, supra note i at 600, 37 Sup. Ct. at 666.
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The congressional report of the United States Commission on Industrial Relations showed that many private employment agencies were quite
unable to meet the needs for which they were supposed to exist. Rather
than actually relieve unemployment and secure jobs for men out of work,
these agencies were operated so as to congest the labor market and to increase the irregularity of employment. The peculiar defects of these agencies and the pressing need for their regulation in the state of Washington,
were fully demonstrated in a published report of the State Bureau of Labor.
Nor had the abuses of employment agencies been accepted as inevitable
and unavoidable. Twenty-four states had attempted direct regulation by
statutes and by municipal ordinances; nineteen had undertaken indirect control by establishing municipal employment offices. This rather extensive
experience in regulating employment agencies had developed the conviction
"that the evils of private agencies were inherent and ineradicable, so long
as they were permitted to charge fees to the workers seeking employment". 6
Furthermore, Mr. Justice Brandeis saw in the Washington statute a
purpose evidently not appreciated at all by Mr. Justice McReynolds. The
purpose behind the act was not merely a negative one; it was also positive:
to strike at that paramount evil in the workingman's life-irregularity of
employment.
"The problem which confronted the people of Washington was
far more comprehensive and fundamental than that of protecting
workers applying to the private agencies. It was the chronic problem
of unemployment-perhaps the gravest and most difficult problem of
Students of the larger problem of unemploymodern industry . .
ment appear to agree that establishment of an adequate system of employment offices or labor exchanges is an indispensable first step toward
its solution. There is reason to believe that the people of Washington
not only considered the collection by the private employment offices of
fees from employees a social injustice; but that they considered the
elimination of the practice a necessary preliminary to the establishment of a constructive policy for dealing with the subject of unemployment." I
This opinion is typical of the research Mr. Justice Brandeis has made
into various social and economic problems with which the Supreme Court
has had to deal during the past sixteen years. It also illustrates the true
I Ibid. But in making such inquiries as Mr. Justice Brandeis undertook, there was no
purpose to ascertain whether the remedy adoptedby the Washington legislature was wise, or
even to discover what were the actual facts, merely as facts: "The sole purpose of the enquiries is to enable this court to decide, whether in view of the facts, actual or possible, the
action of the state of Washington was so clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, that it could not
be taken 'by a free government without a violation of fundamental right'." Ibid.
"Ibid. at 613, 37 Sup. Ct. at 671. Mr. Brandeis has long insisted that "the greatest need
of the working man is regularity of employment. Irregularity of employment creates hardships and demoralization. It is the most sinful waste". Brandeis, Organized Labor and
Efficiency (1911) 26 SURVEY 15o. See also Brandeis, The Road to Social Efficiency (1911)
98 OUTLOOK 291-292.
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nature of that principle of judicial review on which his investigations are
based. In passing upon economic and social legislation, he insisted, the
Court should know the facts. He had comparatively little faith in reason:
"Knowledge is essential to understanding; and understanding should precede judging. Sometimes, if we would guide by the light of reason, we
must let our minds be bold." 8 But in no case should an inquiry into the
facts be made an excuse for judging the wisdom of the disputed legislation, or for making such determination of the facts as would enable the
Court to substitute its own findings for those of the legislature. The "performance of the constitutional function of judicial review" he insisted,
should not be extended to "an exercise of the powers of a super-legislature". 9
"Put at its highest, our function is to determine, in the light of
all facts which may enrich our knowledge and enlarge our understanding, whether the measure, enacted in the exercise of an unquestioned
police power and of a character inherently unobjectionable, transcends
the bounds of reason. That is, whether the provision as applied is so
clearly arbitrary or capricious that legislators acting reasonably could
not have believed it to be necessary or appropriate for the public welfare." 10
His theory is that unless the Court knows "the facts on which the legislators may have acted", it "cannot properly decide whether they were (or
whether their measures are) unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious"."' But
the Court is powerless to decide, as a fact, whether conditions required the
particular measure enacted, or even whether it be calculated to effectuate
the purpose the legislature had in mind.
Labor Economics
While at bar Mr. Brandeis frankly stated his particular concern for
the working man. He saw in the growth of the employer's economic power
'Jay Burns Baking Co. v. Bryan, 264 U. S. 504 at 520, 44 SuP. Ct. 412 at 416 (1924).
' Ibid. at 534, 44 Sup. Ct. at 421.
The position here taken as to judicial review in cases involving social legislation is essentially that stated by Mr. Brandeis in 1911:
"The real test, as I conceive it, is: 'Is there an evil? If there is an evil, is the remedy,
this particular device introduced by the Legislature, directed to remove that evil which threatens health, morals, and welfare? Does it bear a reasonable relation to it? And in applying
it, is there anything discriminatory, which looks like a purpose to injure and not a purpose to
aid? Has there been an arbitrary exercise of power . . . ?'" Brandeis, Minimum Wage
and the Constitution (191)
33 SURVEY 49o at 523.
"Some may doubt whether this Particular remedy is the best remedy, or whether its
adoption may not lead to some other evils which later legislatures may have to deal with,
possibly by a repeal of this law. Even if you entertained a doubt well founded, you cannot
interfere because you have doubts as to the wisdom of an act, provided that act is of such a
character that it may conceivably produce results sought to be attained. When we know
. . . that the evil exists which it is sought to remedy, the legislature must be given latitude
in experimentation." Ibid. at 521.
"Jay Burns Baking Co. v. Bryan, supra note 8, at 534, 44 Sup. Ct. at 421.
"Ibid. at 520, 44 Sup. Ct. at 416.
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a serious threat to the worker's liberty and to the general welfare; and he
felt there would be but "little possibility (in most trades) of attaining the
best possible conditions unless in some form a union of employees exist". 1 2
For this reason he believed that peace and prosperity could not be achieved
by weakening trade unions and by lessening collective bargaining. "Our
hope lies rather in their growing strength and stability." 13
This point of view is maintained in his labor decisions. His dissent
in the famous Hitchman case 14 is not based so much on any nice distinction between "agreeing to join the union" and "joining the union", or on
the technical question whether there had or had not been-a breach of contract. The essential difference is of emphasis and point of view. For the
Court, the right "to make non-membership in a union a condition of employment . . .. is a part of the constitutional rights of personal liberty and
private property, not to be taken away even by legislation ...
." 1.3

Moreover, Mr. Justice Pitney, speaking for the Court, saw in the activity of the union organizers no purpose other than an illegal one: to compel
the company to change its method of operation. To Mr. Justice Brandeis'
mind such activity was motivated by a bona fide desire to increase membership, and hence the bargaining power, of the union. His opinion reveals
realistic evaluation of the trade union as an agency for promoting economic
security among workers; whereas equitable protection of a "yellow dog"
contract, (such contract being rooted in disparity of bargaining power, and
utterly lacking in reciprocal obligation) would seriously jeopardize trade
union growth. What to him was necessary to equalize bargaining power
between employer and employee, and "to establish the equality between the
parties in which liberty of contract begins", 1 6 was denounced by the majority of the Court as an unconstitutional infringement on that very liberty.
Thus two kinds of right were brought in conflict: the property right
of the employer-his right to be protected against illegal interference with
his contract by third parties, and the human or social right of the employeethe right to such increased bargaining power as unionism affords. In contests between property rights and human rights, one and then the other has
BRANDEIS, BusINxss-A PaoFlEssloN (1925) I8.
at 2o. "There is no hope for American democracy unless the American working-

'Ibid.

man is permitted to combine, and, through combination and collective bargaining, secure for
himself the rights of industrial liberty." Hearings before the Committee on Investigation of
the United States Steel Corporation, Jan. 29, 1912, p. 2862
"Of course there isn't any such thing as a law of supply and demand as an inexorable
rule. . . . One reason why the trades union had to come into existence was because the law
of supply and demand did not work properly between the opposing forces of the powerful
employer and the individual worker." Hearings of the New York State Factory Investigating
Commission, January 22, 1915, Vol. 5, P. 2881.
1
Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U. S. 229, 38 Sup. Ct. 65 (1917).
aIbid.at 251, 38 Sup. Ct. at 72.
10

Words of Justice Holmes, dissenting in Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U. S. I at 27, 35 Sup.

Ct. 24o at 248 (1914).
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gained ascendancy, but for Mr. Justice Brandeis the emphasis is always
on human rights.
Although the Supreme Court has not since spoken definitely on the
question in the Hitchman case, there is good reason for thinking the Court
has come around to Mr. Justice Brandeis' view.1 7 The Court today would,
I believe, refuse to aid the enforcement of a "yellow dog" contract. There
is, moreover, growing recognition of a need for wider unionization, which
justifies interference by those not parties to the immediate controversy. In
certain quarters Mr. Justice Brandeis' position has already received more
than verbal recognition. Since the Hitchman case, the "yellow dog" contract has been hounded out of the jurisdiction of New York; I in the statutory enactments of certain states it has been declared against public policy; 19 a nomination to the Supreme Court has been rejected largely because the candidate refused to follow Mr. Justice Brandeis' dissent in the
Hitchman case.20 Today it is almost inconceivable that equity would sanc2
tion the "yellow dog" contract. '
The wide divergence of judicial viewpoint that characterized the
Hitchman case is illustrated also in the Duplex Printing case.2 2 Here the
',
See Texas and New Orleans Ry. v. Brotherhood of Railway & Steamship Clerk*, 281
U. S. 548, 5o Sup. Ct. 427 (1931) where the Court by a unanimous vote sustained an injunction to protect the integrity of collective bargaining against the establishment of a company
union. See also, Carey and Oliphant, The Present Status of the Hitchinan Case (1929) 29
Coi L. REv. 441.
S Exchange Bakery & Restaurant v. Rifkin, 216 App. Div. 663, 2i. N. Y. Supp. 753
,(1926) ; Interborough Rapid Transit Co. v. Green, 131 Misc. 682. 227 N. Y. Stipp. 258
(1928). In the former the court took a position entirely opposed to that of Mr. Justice
Pitney in the Hitchman case: "All engaged in a trade are affected by the prevailing rate of
wages. All, by the principle of collective bargaining. Economic organization today is not
based on a single shop."
"Wisconsin recently enacted a statute declaring "yellow dog" contracts "to be contrary
to public p~olicy, and wholly void and shall not afford any basis for the granting of legal or
equitable relief by any court." Wis. Laws 1929, c. 123. Similar measures were passed in
1931 in the following states: Arizona (C. 19), Colorado (C. 112). Ohio (S. B. lo8) and
Oregon (C. 247).
A bill sent by Congress to President Hoover on March iS, for approval declares the
"yellow dog" contract "to be contrary to public policy of the United States, shall not be enforceable and shall not afford any basis for the granting of legal or equitable relief by any
court of the United Slates." H. R. 5315, 72nd Cong., Ist Sess.
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, in an advisory opinion (In re Opinion of
the Justices, 171 N. E. 294 (1931)) held unconstitutional a provision denying legal or equitable protection to the "yellow dog" contract.
For a discussion of the constitutionality of the Wisconsin act, 'see MacDonald, The Constitutionality of Wisconsih!'s Statute Invalidating "Yellow Dog" Contracts (1931) 6 Wis. L.
REv. 86. The constitutionality of the federal bill is discussed in Frankfurter and G-een,
CongressionalControl Over the Labor Injunction (931) 31 CoL.L. REv. 385.
The Hitchman precedent was followed by Judge Parker in International Organization
v. Red Jacket Consolidated Coal & Coke Co., i8 F. (2d) 839 (C. C. A. 4th, 1927) and this
was certainly instrumental in barring him from the Supreme Court.
'A close reading of the Court's opinion in the Hitchman case might conceivably lead to
the conclusion that the decision was confined to cases of breach of "yellow dog" contracts
where the means employed by the union involved deception and misrepresentation; that the
injunction was sustained as a protection against these abuses rather than as a protection of
the "yellow dog" contract itself. In other words, if the solicitations of labor's representatives
are not accompanied by threats, intimidation, or deceit, they are within their right, and cannot
be restrained. These latter facts were present in the Tri-City case, 257 U. S. 184, 42 Sup.
Ct. 72 (1921) and here Justice Brandeis concurred in the majority opinion.
-Duplex Printing Co. v. Deering, 254 U. S.443, 41 Sup. Ct. 172 (1921).
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employer asked for an order restraining the activities of a labor organization which sought to unionize his shop. The defendants claimed immunity
from injunctive relief under the labor clauses of the Clayton Act; 23 Mr.
Justice Pitney, again speaking for the Court, construed the labor clauses of
that statute narrowly, closing his eyes entirely to trade union program and
policy. He saw in labor's activities no other motive than malicious injury
to the employer. The federal courts, he held, were denied equity jurisdiction under section twenty of the Clayton Act, only in cases where the parties to the dispute were employer and employee, or persons employed and
those seeking employment. The defendants "standing in no relation of
employment under complainant, past, present or prospective .

.

."

there-

fore have no right "to make that dispute their own and proceed to instigate sympathetic strikes, picketing, and boycotting against employers
wholly unconnected with the complainant's factory . . .,,.24
Moreover, in order to enjoy equity exemption, the dispute in question,
Mr. Justice Pitney said, must arise out of "terms or conditions of their own
employment, past, present or prospective". 25 "Congress had in mind particular industrial controversies, not a general class war; .

.

. and it would

do violence to the guarded language employed were the exemption extended
beyond the parties affected in a proximate and substantial, not merely a
sentimental or sympathetic, sense of the cause of dispute." 20
Only when one reads Mr. Justice Brandeis' dissent does one discover
an analysis of the situation evincing sympathetic appreciation of the facts
that underlie modern industrial controversies. He then learns that there
are only four manufacturers of printing presses in the country, all in active
competition. All had been unionized save the Duplex Company. Finally
two of the manufacturers that had consented to union conditions, notified
the union that because of competition they would be obliged to terminate
their agreement unless the Duplex Company raised its standard of labor.
The local machinist's union thereupon called a strike against the Duplex
factory in Battle Creek to compel the Duplex Company to unionize. The
strike order was ineffective; only eleven union machinists actually quit
work. Representatives of the International Machinists Association then
instituted boycotting again Duplex products in and around New York City,
by threatening customers, and intimidating haulers and installers of Duplex presses.
Mr. Justice Brandeis held that the defendants "injured the plaintiff,
not maliciously, but in self-defense;

.

.

. that the contest between the

company and the machinists' union involves vitally the interest of every
38 STAT. 7.30 (I914), I5 U. S. C. A. 12 (1927).
'Duplex Printing Co. v. Deering, supra note 22, at 471, 41 Sup. Ct. at 178.
Ibid. at 472, 41 Sup. Ct. at 178.

Ibid.
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person whose co-operation is sought. May not all", he asks, "with a common interest join in refusing to expend their labor upon articles whose very
production constitutes an attack upon their standard of living and the institution which they are convinced supports it ?" 27 Mr. Justice Pitney's opinion harks back to a common law rule applicable in the days of handicraft,
while for Mr. Justice Brandeis the problem is that of the legal limits of
group activity in an industrial society:
"When centralization in the control of business brought its corresponding centralization in the organization of workingmen, new
facts had to be appraised. A single employer might, as in this case,
threaten the standing of the whole organization and the standards of
all its members." 28
Thus he recognized "the unity of interest throughout the union, and
that, in refusing to work on materials which threaten it, the union was only
refusing to aid in destroying itself". This view formed the basis for Mr.
Justice Brandeis' conclusion that the Court's ruling: that the controversy
was not one "involving, or growing out of, a dispute concerning terms or
conditions of employment", 29 was "founded upon a misconception of the
facts". Mr. Justice Pitney regarded the case as a dispute between two
litigants; Mr. Justice Brandeis saw the issue as one of far-reaching social
consequences.
The essential point in the Duplex case was whether the Clayton Act
had forbidden federal courts to issue an injunction in that type of case; the
question of reasonable or unreasonable restraint was not involved. The
latter point came before the Court in the more recent Bedford Cut Stone
case. 30 The significance of this decision can be gleaned from the analysis
by Mr. Justice Brandeis-an analysis unchallenged by the majority:
"The combination complained of is the co-operation of persons
wholly of the same craft, united in a national union, solely for selfprotection. No outsider-be he quarrier, dealer, builder or laborerwas a party to the combination. No purpose was to be subserved except to promote the trade interests of members of the Journeymen's
Association." 31
Thus the facts in this case differed essentially from those in the Duplex
case.
-'Ibid.at 481, 41 Sup. Ct. at ISi.
'Ibid. at 482, 41 Sup. Ct. at 182.
2 Language of § 2o of the Clayton Act.
"' Bedford Cut Stone Co. v. Journeymen Cutters' Ass'n. 274 U. S. 37, 47 Sup. Ct. 522
(i927).
" Mr. Justice Brandeis pointed out that the union consisted of approximately 50oo workers, divided into Iso locals. Standing alone these locals were weak. The average employer
could destroy a local over night by importing scabs from other cities. It was only through
combining .ooo organized stonecutters in a national union and developing loyalty to it, that
the individual stonecutter anywhere can protect his own job. Ibid. at 6o, 47 Sup. Ct. at 529.
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"There was no attempt by the unions to boycott the plaintiffs.
There was no attempt to seek the aid of members of any other craft,
by a sympathetic strike or otherwise. The contest was not a class
struggle. It was a struggle between particular employers and their
employees. But the controversy out of which it arose, related, not to
specific grievances, but to fundamental matters of union policy of
general application throughout the country." 82
To protect their interests, the union had begun to enforce the provision of their constitution that "No member of this Association shall cut,
carve or fit any material that has been cut by men working in opposition
to this Association." 33 It was against union effort to enforce this order
that the Bedford Cut Stone Company sought an injunction. After Judge
Anderson of the Indiana District Court and Judge Alschuln of the Circuit
Court of Appeals had refused to grant the order, finding no warrant for
issuing it, the Supreme Court arguing that the Duplex opinion "might
serve as an opinion in this case", reversed the two lower courts and ordered
an injunction to issue. And this although the conduct of the union was
admittedly innocent unless, in the Sherman Act, Congress had declared it
illegal as a restraint upon the plaintiff's interstate trade, for union officials
to urge members not to work on stone cut by men opposed to the union.
According to Mr. Justice Sutherland's decision the activities of the union
had precisely the effect of contravening the Sherman Act. He held that
although the union was lawful and had a lawful end in view, its operations
34
"necessarily threatened to destroy or narrow petitioners' interstate trade".
Such a ruling was extraordinary in view of the fact that even Chief
Justice Taft, whom labor has usually regarded as unsympathetic with its
claims, had recognized the social advantages of trade unions, the necessity
of extending the combination beyond one shop, and the right of laborers
to refuse to work on the product of employers who seek.destruction of the
union. It ignored, moreover, the "rule of reason" which the Court had held
applicable in the interpretation of the Sherman Act as regards cases involving capitalistic interests. Mr. Justice Brandeis' reaction to the extraordinary situation thus created, is expressed in concluding his dissenting
opinion:
"Members of the Journeymen Stone Cutters' Association could
not work anywhere on stone which had been cut at the quarries by
'men working in opposition' to it, without aiding and abetting the enemy.
Observance by each member of the provision of their constitution
which forbids such action was essential to his own self-protection . .
Ibid.
m Ibid. at 56, 47 Sup. Ct. at 528.
Compare with Chief Justice Taft's opinion in United Leather Workers v. Herbert &
Meisel Trunk Co., 265 U. S. 457, 44 Sup. Ct. 623 (1924).
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If, on the undisputed facts of this case, refusal to work can be enjoined,
Congress created by the Sherman Law and the Clayton Act an instrument for imposing restraints upon labor which reminds of involuntary servitude."

35

It was settled in the Standard Oil 36 and American Tobacco -1 cases
that only unreasonable restraints of trade are forbidden by the Sherman
Act. But this statute set up no standard of reasonableness. The judges must
supply one, and they are by no means in agreement. Their judgment is
likely to turn not upon law but rather upon the views they severally hold
regarding economic policy, or the ideas they have as to freedom to be allowed
various economic forces.
To Mr. Justice Sutherland "the Anti-Trust Act had a broader application than the prohibition of restraints of trade unlawful at common law". 38
Reading the Act strictly, he held its effect was to declare illegal "every
contract, combination or conspiracy, in whatever form, of whatever nature,
and whoever may be the parties to it, which directly or necessarily operates
in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States". 39 It was easy
then to bring the activities of the unions within its provisions. But to Mr.
Justice Brandeis, "the propriety of the union's conduct can hardly be doubted
by one who believes in organization of labor". He insisted, moreover, that
the "rule of reason" is as applicable in construing the Sherman Act in labor
cases as it is in capital cases:
"The Sherman Law was held in United States v. United States
Steel Corporation,251 U. S. 417, to permit capitalists to combine in a
single corporation 50 per cent of the steel industry of the United States
dominating the trade through its vast resources. The Sherman Law
was held in United States v. United Shoe Machinery Co., 247 U. S.
32, to permit capitalists to combine in another corporation practically
the whole shoe machinery industry of the country, necessarily giving
it a position of dominance over shoe-manufacturing in America. It
would, indeed, be strange if Congress had by the same Act willed to
deny to members of a small craft of workingmen the right to cooperate in simply refraining from work, when that course was the only

'Bedford
at 531.
'Standard

Cut Stone Co. v. Journeymen Cutters' Ass'n, supra note 30, at 64, 47 Sup. Ct.
Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U. S. 1, 31 Sup. Ct. 632 (19i).
221 U. S. io6, 31 Sup. Ct. 632 (Ig9).
Cut Stone Co. v. journeymen Cutters' Ass'n, supra note 3o, at .52, 47 Sup. Ct.

" United States v. American Tobacco Co.,
'Bedford

at 527.

'Ibid. The Court's conception of the scope of the act clearly belies the intentions of the

framers as expressed by Senator Sherman: "It does not announce a new principle of law,
but applies old and well-recognized principles of the common law to the complicated jurisdiction of our state and federal government. . . . The purpose of this bill is to enable the
courts of the United States to apply the same remedies against combinations which injuriously
affect the interests of the United States that have been applied in the several states to protect
local interests." SHERmAN, REcoiLcnoNs OF FORTY YEARS (1895) 1072.
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means of self-protection against a combination of militant and powerful employers.

I cannot believe that Congress did so."

40

Mr. Justice Stone evidently appreciated the force of this conclusion,
for as "an original proposition" he would "have doubted whether the Sherman Act prohibited a labor union from peaceably refusing to work upon
material produced by non-union labor or by a rival union even though
In view of the policy as to organinterstate commerce were affected"..4
ized labor adopted by Congress in the Clayton Act and in view of the Court's
decisions in the Standard Oil and American Tobacco cases, he would not
have thought "that such action as is now complained of was to be regarded
as an unreasonable and therefore prohibited restraint of trade". 42 And
yet a strange deference to authority moved him to concur. Views which
logically he should not have hesitated to apply here, were rejected on the
authority of the Duplex Printing case. "For that reason alone", he agreed
with the majority.
Mr. Justice Brandeis pays no such respect to past cases. "'Stare decis s", he believes, "is ordinarily a wise rule of action. But it is not a universal, inexorable command."

43

It "does not command that we err again

when we have occasion to pass upon a different statute". 4 4 This proposition, I suppose, would be equally applicable in the interpretation of the
same statute. This would seem to follow from his observation that "it
behooves us to reject, as guides, the decisions which prove to have been
mistaken . . . The logic of words should yield to the logic of realities". 4 5
In short, Mr. Justice Brandeis feels that the peculiar virtue of our system
of law lies in the fact "that the process of inclusion and exclusion, so often
employed in developing a rule, is not allowed to end with its enunciation
and that an expression in an opinion yields later to the impact of facts unforeseen".4 " "The rule as announced must be deemed tentative. For the
many and varying facts to which it will be applied cannot be foreseen.
Modification implies growth. It is the life of the law." 4
English policy defines the rights of labor by legislative enactment; in
this country such definition has been largely the work of the courts. Our
legislatures, both federal and state, have been signally unsuccessful in
ameliorating the stringency of judge-made labor law. Both have made
"Bedford Cut Stone Co. v. Journeymen Cutters' Ass'n, supra note 3o, at 65, 47 Sup. Ct.
at 531. See, in this connection, the interesting observations of Professor Corwin in his recent article, The Anti-Trust Acts and the Constitiutio (1932) iS VA. L. REv. 355 at 372 et
seq. "Ibid.
sa
at 55, 47 Sup. Ct. at 528.

'Ibid.

"See Washington v. Dawson & Co., 264 U. S. 219, 2.38, 44 Sup. Ct. 302, 309
for citation of cases in which the Court has disregarded the Principle of stare decisis.
"Di Santo v. Pennsylvania, 273 U. S.34 at 42, 47 Sup. Ct. 267 at 270 (1927).
" Ibid.

(1924)

'jaybird Mining Co. v. Weir, 271 U. S.6o9 at 619, 46 Sup. Ct. 592 at 595 (1926).
' Washington v. Dawson & Co., supra note 43, at 235, 239, 44 Sup. Ct. at 308, 309.
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repeated efforts to rid labor of the injunction incubus. But the courts have
either construed the immunity clauses narrowly, and held the statute largely
declaratory of the existing law (as was true as to the labor clauses of the
Clayton Act), or have held the statute wanting on constitutional grounds.
Even if the Clayton Ace had exempted labor from the injunction in such
disputes as the Duplex case, the exemption would be of questionable constitutionality in the light of Chief Justice Taft's decision in Truax v. Cor48
rigan.
This case involved an Arizona statute which placed much the same
limitation on state courts of equity as was imposed upon federal courts of
equity to sections six and twenty of the Clayton Act. Chief Justice Taft
found the statute wanting under both the "equal protection" clause and the
"due process" clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. He held that persons
may be as effectively denied equal protection of the laws by conferring a
favor as by imposing a penalty; that even in the absence of violence an
employer may not be deprived of the only effective protection he has against
such operations of labor, namely the injunction. Chief Justice Taft's argument boils down to the proposition that there is a minimum of protection
to which a property or business owner is entitled, and of which he may not
be deprived by denial of equitable relief without invading those fundamental rights guarafiteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.
Mr. Justice Brandeis evidently felt that this decision was reached without adequate appreciation and consideration of the facts of modern industrial life. "The divergence of opinion", he observed, "in this difficult field
of governmental action should admonish us not to declare a rule arbitrary
and unreasonable merely because we are convinced that it is fraught with
danger to the public weal, and thus to close the door to experiment within
the law." 49 He also detailed the sort of consideration the case before the
Court demanded:
"Whether a law enacted in the exercise of the police power is
justly subject to the charge of being unreasonable or arbitrary, can
ordinarily be determined only by a consideration of the contemporary conditions, social, industrial and political, of the community to
be affected thereby. Resort to such facts is necessary, among other
things, in order to appreciate the evils sought to be remedied and the
possible effects of the remedy proposed. Nearly all legislation involves a weighing of public needs as against private desires; and likewise a weighing of relative social values. Since government is not
an exact science, prevailing public opinion concerning the evils and
the remedy is among the important facts deserving consideration;
particularly, when the public conviction is both deep-seated and widespread and has been reached after deliberation. What, at any partic48257 U.

S. 312, 42 Sup. Ct. 124 (1921).

"Ibid. at 357,

42 SuP.

Ct. at 139.
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ular time, is the paramount public need is, necessarily, largely a matter
of judgment. Hence, in passing upon the validity of a law challenged
as being unreasonable, aid may be derived from the experience of
other countries and of the several States of our Union in which the
common law and its conceptions of liberty prevail." -o
Therefore, he made, in brief compass, the most thorough investigation
yet undertaken of the development of labor law in the English-speaking
countries. This study revealed, among other things, that, in England, improvement of the condition of workingmen and their emancipation appear
to have been deemed recently the paramount public need; resort to the injunction has not been frequent and it has played no appreciable part there
in the conflict between capital and labor; that the history of the rules governing contests between employer and employee in several English-speaking
countries illustrates both the susceptibility of such rules to change and the
variety of contemporary opinion as to what rules will best serve the public
interest.5 1
But in the United States it was felt that
"The equitable remedy, although applied in accordance with established practice, involved incidents which . . .endangered the personal
liberty of wage-earners . . .; that the real motive in seeking the in-

junction was not ordinarilyto prevent property from being injured nor
to protect the owner in its use, but to endow property with active, militant power which would make it dominant over men. In other words,
that, under the guise of protecting property rights, the employer was
seeking sovereign power. And many disinterested men, solicitous only
for the public welfare, believed that the law of property was not appro-

priate for dealing with the forces beneath social unrest; that in this
vast struggle it was unwise to throw the power of the State on one.
side or the other according to principles deduced from that law; that
the problem of the control and conduct of industry demanded a solution of its own; and that, pending the ascertainment of new principles
to govern industry, it was wiser for the State not to interfere in industrial struggles by the issuance of an injunction." 5'
As to the growth of this opinion, Ir. Justice Brandeis points out that
legislative anti-injunctive proposals have occupied the attention of Congress during every session but one in the twenty years between 1894 and
1914. But not until the present session of Congress did these efforts culminate in the Norris Bill sent to President Hoover for his approval on March
18. Several states had previously passed legislation on the subject. 3 MorecoIbid. at 356, 42 Sup. Ct. at 138.

rtIbid.

'Ibid. at 366, 368, 42 Sul. Ct. at 142, 143. The italics are the writer's.
t For list of citations to these statutes, see Mason, Or.qanized Labor as Party Plaintiff in
Injunmction Case (193o) 3o CoL. L. REV. 466, n. 2.
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over, Mr. Justice Brandeis contends, the constitution does not stand in the
way of such legislation.
"States are free since the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment as they were before, either to expand or to contract their equity
jurisdiction. The denial of the more adequate equitable remedy for
private wrongs is in essence an exercise of the police power, by which,
in the interest of the public and in order to preserve the liberty and
the property of the great majority of the citizens of a State, rights of
property and the liberty of the individual must be remoulded, from
time to time, to meet the changing needs of society." .4
Here, as elsewhere, Mr. Justice Brandeis looks beyond the immediate
dispute to its underlying social implications: "it is of the nature of our law
that it has dealt not with man in general but with him, in relationships".r
He understands that a relationship such as employer and employee may furnish legal basis for a classification which satisfies the equal protection requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment; that the law is "'forced to
adapt itself to new conditions of society, and, particularly to the new relations between employers and employees fts they arise' ".56
Although a staunch advocate of industrial liberty and collective bargaining, Mr. Justice Brandeis has never condoned abuses by trade unions.5 7
He admits that their action is frequently hasty and ill-considered; that
they too often ignore laws which seem to restrict their efforts.
As a member of the Supreme Court he has followed the principle he
announced while at bar, that "industrial liberty, like civil liberty, must rest
upon the solid foundation of law"."' For the excesses of trade unions he
' Truax v. Corrigan, supra note 48, at 376,

42 Sup. Ct. at 146.
' Mr. Justice Brandeis paid this same deference to legislative discretion in his dissenting
opinion in the Duplex case: "The conditions developed in industry may be such that those
engaged in it cannot continue their struggle without danger to the community. But it is not
for judges to determine whether such conditions exist, nor is it their function to set the limits
of permissible contests and to declare the duties which the new situation demands. This is
the function of the legislature which, while limiting individual and group rights of aggression
and defense. may substitute processes of justice for the more primitive method of trial by
combat." Duplex Printing Co. v. Deering, supra note 22, at 488, 41 Sup. Ct. at 184.
Quoted from Holden v. Hardy, 169 U. S. 366 at 387, 18 Sup. Ct. 383 at .386 (1898) in
his dissenting opinion in Adams v. Tanner, supra note I, at 616, 37 Sup. Ct. at 673.
The plea of trade unions for immunity, be it from injunction or from liability for damages, is as fallacious as the plea of the lynchers . . . We gain nothing by exchanging the
tyranny of capital for the tyranny of labor. Arbitrary demands must be met by determined
refusals . . . at any cost. BRANDEIS, op. cit. supra note 12, at 26.
"No one can be more conscious than I am of the abuses of trade organizations. Their
acts are in many instances acts to be condemned, acts to be opposed, acts to be suppressed;
but they are like all the abuses of liberty with which we are familiar. We must maintain
liberty, political liberty, in spite of its abuses, and we must maintain the liberty of combination
and encourage combination on the part of unions, but hold them up to the high responsibility
of using that will power which is intrusted to them: and to my mind, if we once come to a
time where instead of fighting for their existence, their existence is assured them, and they
fight only for their rights, a large part of the abuses of which we complain today on the part
of organized labor will cease." Statement by Mr. Justice Brandeis before the House Committee, Hearings on Investigations of the United States Steel Corporation, Jan. 29, I912,
P. 862.
1BRANDEIS, op. cit. suprat note 12, at 26.
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offered a remedy that no orthodox trade unionist has thus far been willing
to accept-that of incorporation. "9 Thus it was easy for him to join Chief
Justice Taft, in the Coronado case,6 0 in ruling that a trade union, although
an unincorporated association, is suable and liable to treble damages under
sections seven and eight of the Sherman Act.
Denounced by laborers on all sides as a most serious "blow to human
freedom", 61 Mr. Justice Brandeis doubtless saw in the decision a gain for
labor of no small importance. He understood that that immunity from
suit and legal responsibility, cherished by labor, erected foundations for
the greatest grievance labor has suffered at the hands of the court-so-called
government by injunction. In his opinion ."if courts had been dealing with
a responsible union instead of irresponsible defendants, they would doubt62
less in many of the cases, have refused to interfere by injunction".
Now, with the bestowal of legal capacity upon trade unions by judicial decision, making them suable and the funds accumulated for the purpose of conducting strikes subject to execution in suits for torts, the chief
grounds on which appeals to equity courts have succeeded are seriously
undermined. In the Coronado decision he could see the partial attainment
of that for which labor had been working since the Debs cse,.3 namely,
limitation upon the use of injunctions in labor disputes. More than that,
he believed incorporation would tend to correct trade-union abuses.6 4 And
not least of the reasons for incorporating trade unions is that it would re'Brandeis, The Incorporationof Trade Unions (19o2) 15 GREEN BAG II.
c'United Mine Workers v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U. S. .44, 42 Sup. Ct. 570
Mr. Brandeis, in an address delivered in 19o2, anticipated the Coronado decision:

(1922).

"The rules of law established by the courts of this country -afford . . . no justification
for this opinion [that trade unions cannot be made legally responsible for their acts]. A
union, although a voluntary unincorporated association, is legally responsible for its acts in
much the same way that an individual; a Partnership, or a corporation is responsible. If a

union, through its constituted agents, commits a wrong or is guilty of violence or of illegal
oppression, the union, and not merely the individuals who are the direct instruments of the
wrong, can be enjoined or made liable for damages to the same extent that the union can be
if it were incorporated; and the funds belonging to the unincorporated union can be reached
to satisfy any damages which might be recovered for the wrong done." Brandeis, op. cit.
supranote 59, at 12.
01The AmaaIcA- FEDERATIONIsT, official organ of the American Federation of Labor,
commented on the decision as follows: "The Supreme Court has not only rendered a decision
which goes beyond the previous decision of that tribunal in its antagonism and opposition to
labor, but it has rendered such a decision when under the law of the land and under practices
hitherto obtaining its decision should have been exactly the reverse." (1922) 29 AMERICAN
FEDERATIONIST 509.

Brandeis, op. cit. supra note 59, at 13. "While the rules of legal liability apply fully to
the unions, though unincorporated, it is, as a practical matter, more difficult for the plaintiff
to conduct the litigation, and it is Particularly difficult to reach the funds of the union with
which to satisfy any judgment that may be recovered. There has consequently arisen, not a
legal, but a Practical immunity of the unions, as such, for any wrongs committed." Ibid.
at 12-13.
"This practical immunity of the labor unions from suit and legal liability is deemed by
many labor leaders a great advantage. To me it apears to be iust the reverse. It tends to
make officers and members reckless and lawless, and thereby to alienate public sympathy and
bring failure upon their efforts." Ibid. at i.
3Inre Debs, 158 U. S. 564, 15 Sup. Ct. 900 (1895).
I,"For these defects, [hasty, ill-considered and lawless action among trade unionists,]
being but human, no complete remedy can be found; but the incorporation of labor unions
would, in some measure, tend to correct them." Brandeis, op. cit. supra note 59, at 12.
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move the "more or less groundless idea on the part of the employers that
there was something in incorporation which would put a union on an equality with the corporation itself".6 A blow to labor almost equal to the Corozado decision is Dorchy v.
Kaizsas.66 "Neither the common law nor the Fourteenth Amendment, confers the absolute right to strike." This is the authoritative declaration of
the Supreme Court. And even more discouraging to labor, these are the
67
words of Mr. Justice Brandeis and not of Mr. Justice Sutherland.
Dorchy, a trade union officer, called a strike to compel payment of a
disputed wage claim to an ex-employee. Convicted under sections seventeen and nineteen of the Kansas Industrial Court Act,68 Dorchy brought
the case before the Supreme Court on a writ of error, his chief contention
being that these sections of the act, prohibiting as they do the right to
strike, contravened the Fourteenth Amendment. Mr. Justice Brandeis
disposed of the case in few words:
"The right to carry on business-be it called liberty or propertyhas value. To interfere with this right without just cause is unlawful. The fact that the injury was inflicted by a strike is sometimes a
justification. But a strike may be illegal because of its purpose, however orderly the manner in which it is conducted. To collect a stale
claim due to a fellow member of the union who was formerly employed in the business is not a permissible purpose . . . To enforce

payment by a strike is clearly coercion. The legislature may make
such action punishable criminally, as extortion or otherwise." 69
In this decision Mr. Justice Brandeis was invoking a rule he deemed
applicable in considering the legality of trade union practices. 70 Nor is his
opinion so far-reaching as may appear at first glance. Without the statute,
'6Statement before the Commission on Industrial Relations, 64th Cong., ist Sess. 26 SEN.
Doc. 7671 (1915).
272 U. S. 3o6, 47 Sup. Ct. 86 (1926).
The legal information bureau of the American Federation of Labor made this quite
submissive comment on the decision:
"It now seems clear that our various state legislatures may declare strikes for certain
objects to be unlawful, and any one urging such a strike may be deemed guilty of a felony,
and be subject to fine and imprisonment. This decision in the Dorchy case will undoubtedly
be the forerunner of several attempts to curtail the right of labor unions to strike." (1926)
33 A aI Ic" FEDmAnolislr 1502. One finds little or nothing in the opinion to warrant any
such prediction. The Court expressly pointed out that the decision was of limited scope-that
the question requiring decision was not "the broad one whether the legislature has power to
prohibit strikes".
'KAN. REv. STAT. ANN. (192.3) §44-617, § 4-61g. Section 617 makes it unlawful to
conspire to induce others to quit their employment "for the purpose and with the intent to
hinder, delay, limit or suspend the operation" of any business affected with a public interest.
Section 61g makes it a felony for an officer of a labor union to use power or influence incident
to his office to induce another person to violate any provision of the act.
Dorchy v. Kansas, s.pra note 66, at 311, 47 Sup. Ct. at 87.
7o"If unions are lawless, restrain and punish their lawlessness: if they are arbitrary.
repress their arbitrariness; if their demands are unreasonable and unjust, resist them; but do
not oppose the unions as such." Brandeis. loc. cit. supra note .9- From a speech entitled
"The Incorporation of Trade Unions", delivered before a meeting of the Economic Club of
Boston on December 4, 1902.
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the strike might well have been condemned as illegal, as a conspiracy at
common law. 71 And lest erroneous implications be drawn, Mr. Justice
Brandeis adds that "the question requiring decision is not .

.

. the broad

72
one whether the legislature has power to prohibit strikes".
Holding, as he does, that trade unions have accomplished much, that
"their fundamental principle is noble", 3 Mr. Justice Brandeis' labor decisions
naturally incline toward increasing the power of unions and toward limiting
the use of injunctions in industrial disputes. He believes in trade unions
even more strongly because he understands that higher wages, reasonable
hours of work and better working conditions, benefit society as a whole. 74
But despite an evident desire to protect workers from the tyranny and
oppression of their employers, his decisions evince no purpose to exchange
the tyranny of capital for that of labor. He still insists that the lawless
methods of trade unions, whether violence or intimidation or less warlike
infringements of legal rights, "must be put down at once and at any cost". 75

Public Utility Economics
The Supreme Court has long since ceased to be merely a legal tribunal;
today it passes upon great social and economic issues. This has not always
been the case.

In Munn v. Illinois, 76 decided in 1876, the Court adopted

a position of non-interference in rate-making, claiming that fixing public
utility rates was a legislative matter which should remain free from judicial interference. Ten years later the Court changed its position. 77 It was
then recognized that this power of the legislature was not without limit;
that utility rates must yield a fair return upon a fair valuation of the property devoted to such a public service. Although the Court two years later 7s
retreated somewhat from this position, when it suddenly recognized that it
was without a basis upon which to question legislative control over public
utility prices, all misgivings on the latter score had vanished by the year
189o, wher' the Court held judicial review applicable in public utility cases,
and maintained that due process of law requires the rate to be reasonable,
and that of this the Court is final judge .7 The right of judicial review in
See, in this connection, Mason, The Right to Strike (1928) 77 U.
Dorchy v. Kansas, mipra note 66, at 309, 47 Sup. Ct. at 86.

OF

PA. L. REv.

52.

c'Brandeis, loc. cit. supranote 59.
' "The conditions under which so large a part of our fellow citizens work and live will
determine, in great measure, the future of our country for good or for evil." Ibid.
BRANDEIS, op. cit. supra note 12, at 26.
94 U. S. 113 (1876).
o
SRailroad Commission cases, 116 U. S. 3o7 at 331, 6 Sup. Ct. 334 at 344 (1886).
"Dow v. Beidelman, 125 U. S. 68o at 691, 8 Sup. Ct. 1O28 at lO31 (1887).
I Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul R. R. v. Minnesota, 134 U. S. 418, io Sup. Ct. 462

(890).

This same position had been adopted
v. Kansas, 123 U. S. 623, 8 Sup. Ct. 273
"The courts are not bound by mere
They are at liberty-indeed, are under

by Mr. Justice Harlan a few years earlier in Mugler
(1887), which involved a state prohibition statute.
forms, nor are they to be misled by mere pretences.
a solemn duty-to look at the substance of things,
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this field was more boldly stated in the classic case of Smyth v. Ames. "
This step was taken despite the prior protest of a minority which had held
that judges are not equipped to decide social and economic issues.81 Certainly judges, passing upon such questions, can find precious little guidance
in the Constitution.
The interpretations of "due process of law", "just compensation",
"deprivation of liberty and property" are susceptible of flexibility, to say
the least. By such interpretation, the Supreme Court can give in large
measure, its own definition of social and economic relationships.8 2 What is
there, for instance, in the "due process" clause of the Fourteenth Amendment that hints whether five, six or eight per cent. be a fair return on public utility property? What is there that sheds light on whether utilities
should be valued for rate-making purposes at original cost, or at reproduction cost new? What indication is there of the measure of return needed
for computing fair and reasonable rates? Absolutely none. These questions must be settled in court by applying highly controversial economic
theories. Without enjoying rate-making power, as such, the courts have
come to exercise power of tremendous importance in rate-making.
It was in Smyth v. Ames 83 that the Supreme Court constituted itself
final judge of "fair return" within the meaning of the "due process"
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The case is especially significant for
its enumeration of the elements to be taken into account in determining
the value of the property on which a fair return is guaranteed.
"We hold .

.

. that the basis of all calculations as to the rea-

sonableness of rates to be charged by a corporation maintaining a highway under legislative sanction must be the fair value of the property
being used by it for the convenience of the public. And in order to
ascertain that value, the original cost of construction, the amount expended in permanent improvements, the amount and market value of
its [the company's] bonds and stock, the present as compared with the
whenever they enter upon the inquiry whether the legislature has transcended the limits of its
authority. If, therefore, a statute purporting to have been enacted to protect the public
health, the public morals, or the public safety, has no real or substantial relation to those
objects, or is a palpable invasion of rights secured by the fundamental law, it is the duty of
the courts to so adjudge, and thereby give effect to the Constitution." At 661, 8 Sup. Ct.
at2%'I69 U. S. 466, i8
Sup. Ct. 418 (1898).
"The idea that any legislature, state or Federal, can conclusively determine for the people
and for the courts that what it enacts in the form of law, or what it authorizes its agents to
do, is consistent with the fundamental law, is in opposition to the theory of our institutions.
The duty rests upon all courts, Federal and state, when their jurisdiction is properly invoked,
to see to it that no right secured by the supreme law of the land is impaired or destroyed by
Q
legislation." At 527, 18 Sup. Ct. at 426.
' See the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Bradley with whom Justices Gray and Lamar
concurred in Chicago, &c. Ry. v. Minnesota, supra note 79, at 461, io Sup. Ct. at 467.
' "The United States Supreme Court," writes Professor John R. Commons, "occupies the
unique position of the first authoritative faculty of political economy in world history". ComONS, LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF CAPITALISM (1924) 7.
"Under the Fourteenth Amendment the Supreme Court of the United States, . . . becomes really the economic dictator." Words of Senator Borah, 72 CONG. REC. 3573 (1930).
169 U. S. 466, 18 Sup. Ct. 418 (i89).
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original cost of construction, the probable earning capacity of the
property under particular rates prescribed by statute, and the sum required to meet operating expenses, are all matters for consideration,
and are to be given such weight as may be just and right in each
case." 84
This judicial rule of rate-making embraces simultaneously three theories of valuation: (i) Historical cost of tangible property plus that of permanent improvements. (2) Capitalization and commercial value of the
business, as determined by current market prices of the company's stocks
and bonds. (3) Cost of reproduction new, less depreciation.
Mr. Justice Brandeis has denounced this rule as "legally and economically unsound". His reasoning follows:
"The rule does not measure the present value either by what the
utility cost to produce; or by what it should have cost; or by what it
would cost to reproduce, or to replace, it. Under that rule the tribunal
is directed, in forming its judgment, to take into consideration all
those and also, other elements, called relevant facts.
"Obviously, 'value' cannot be a composite of all these elements.
Nor can it be arrived at on all these bases. They are very different;
and must, when applied in a particular case, lead to widely different
results. The rule of Smyth v. Ames, as interpreted and applied, means
merely that all must be considered. What, if any, weight shall be
given to any one, must practically rest in the judicial discretion of the
tribunal which makes the determination." 85
Furthermore, the court has divided since then in a long line of important decisions regarding the relative weight to be given various factors in
rate base determination. The theory of reproduction cost is, in Mr. Justice Brandeis' opinion, particularly faulty. It is vague, delusive and leaves
room for wide divergence of opinion.
This theory of valuation has had a varied and curious history. It
was urged in 1893 in behalf of the community. William Jennings Bryan
appeared in the Smyth case and argued in favor of present value based
on reproduction cost, as protection against inflated claims based on past
high prices. The long depression after the panic of 1893 had brought
prices to the lowest level of the Nineteenth Century. Insistence upon reproduction cost was the shipper's protest against the burdens of watered
stock, reckless financing, and racketeering contracts. During the rising
prices of the World War, railroads and other public utilities adopted the
position then taken by Bryan on behalf of the consumers. The foundations
are now laid for another shift of position. The vagueness and uncertainty
I Ibid. at 546, 18 Sup. Ct. at 434.
' Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm., 262 U. S. 276 at
544 at 548 (1923).

294,

43 Sup. Ct.
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of the existing rule has prompted Mr. Justice Brandeis to make a detailed
study of public utility valuation. He proposes a substitute rule:
"The experience of the twenty-five years since [Smyth v. Ames]
• was decided has demonstrated that the rule there enunciated
is delusive. In the attempt to apply it insuperable obstacles have been
encountered. It has failed to afford adequate protection either to capital or to the public. It leaves open the door to grave injustice
.8
"The rule of Smyth v. Ames sets the laborious and baffling
task of finding the present value of the utility. It is impossible to find
an exchange value for a utility, since utilities, unlike merchandise or
land, are not commonly bought and sold in the market. Nor can the
present value of the utility be determined by capitalizing its net earnings, since the earnings are determined, in large measure, by the rate
which the company will be permitted to charge; and, thus, the vicious
circle would be encountered." s
To give capital embarked in public utilities its due protection under
the Constitution, Mr. Justice Brandeis insists "that the rate base be definite, stable and readily ascertainable; and that the percentage to be earned
on the rate base be measured by the cost, or charge, of the capital employed
in the enterprise".88 The rule announced in the Smyth case, he insisted,
was signally faulty on this very score. "Under it value for rate-making
purposes must ever be an unstable factor." Mr. Justice Brandeis felt, moreover, that there was a widespread conviction regarding the inadequacy of
the existing rule; a feeling that "actual value of a utility is not to be reached
by a meticulous study of conflicting estimates of the cost of reproducing
new the congeries of old machinery and equipment, called the plant, and
the still more fanciful estimates concerning the value of the intangible elements of an established business".8 9
Mr. Justice Brandeis proceeded therefore to offer what he believed
"a definite, stable and readily ascertainable" rate base, and also a measure
of fair rate of return. As to the first, he sponsored a theory of valuation
followed by many commissions, especially that of Massachusetts: "'Capital honestly and prudently invested must, under normal conditions, be taken
as the controlling factor in fixing the basis for computing fair and reasonable rates'." 'o In support of this rule he argued as follows:
"The adoption of the amount prudently invested as the rate base
and the amount of the capital charge as the measure of the rate of
return would give definiteness to these two factors involved in rate
controversies which are now shifting and treacherous, and which render the proceedings peculiarly burdensome and largely futile. Such
Ibid. at

292, 43 Sup. Ct. at 548.
at 292, 43 Sup. Ct. at 548.
'Ibid. at 301, 43 Sup. Ct. at 551.

'Ibid.

"Ibid.
10Ibid.
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measures offer a basis for decision which is certain and stable. The
rate base would be ascertained- as a fact, not determined as a matter of
opinion. It would not fluctuate with the market price of labor, or
materials, or money. It would not change with hard times or shifting populations. It would not be distorted by the fickle and varying
judgments of appraisers, commissions, or courts. It would, when once
made in respect to any utility, be fixed, for all time, subject only to increases to represent additions to plant, after allowance for the depreciation included in the annual operating charges. The wild uncertainties of the present method of fixing the rate base under the so-called
rule of Smyth v. Ames would be avoided; and likewise the fluctuations
which introduce into the enterprise unnecessary elements of speculation, create useless expense, and impose upon the public a heavy, unnecessary burden."

91

As to reasonable rate of return, he argued for "the cost to the utility
of the capital, required to construct, equip and operate its plant".92

"Cost

includes not -only operating expenses, but also capital charges. Capital
charges cover the allowance, by way of interest, for the use of the capital,
whatever the nature of the security issued therefor; the allowance for risk
incurred; and enough more to attract capital." 93
It is conceded that the actual prudent investment rule would have been
difficult or impossible to apply when Smyth v. Ames was decided. It was
then impossible to ascertain, Mr. Justice Brandeis admits, what it cost in
money to establish the utility; or what the money cost with which the utility was established, or what income had been earned by it; or how the
income had been expended. Now, the situation, he thinks, is fundamentally different: "These amounts are, now, readily ascertainable in respect to
a large, and rapidly increasing, proportion of the utilities.

.

. . It is, there-

fore, feasible now to adopt as the measure of a compensatory rate-the
annual cost, or charge, of the capital prudently invested in the utility. And,
hence, it should be done." 9'
Much dicta in the majority opinion in the Southwestern Bell Telephone
case make strongly for the reproduction cost theory. But the rates there
involved were so inadequate that they did not bring a fair return even on
the actual cost of the properties, much less the reproduction cost. This
explains why Mr. Justice Brandeis concurred in reversing the state court.
He joined in declaring the rates confiscatory, but did so because they did
not bring a fair return on the actual investment.
Much the same observations may be made with reference to the Bluefield case.95 Here the rates were held to be confiscatory. Mr. Justice But"1Ibid. at 306, 43 Sup. Ct. at 553.
'Ibid. at 306, 43 Sup. Ct. at 552.
' Ibid. at 291, 43 Sup. Ct. at 547.
"' Ibid. at 309, 43 Sup. Ct. at 554.

' Bluefield Water Works & Improvement Co. v. Public Serv. Comm., 262 U. S.679, 43

Sup. Ct. 675

(,923).
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ler, speaking for the Court used dicta which indicated the Court's leaning
toward reproduction cost. Again Mr. Justice Brandeis concurred in holding that the rates were confiscatory. He considered the rates invalid because they did not yield a fair return on the actual investment. In both
the Southwestern Bell Telephone and Bluefield cases Mr. Justice Brandeis
concurred in the decisions but not in the dicta in favor of reproduction cost.
In the Georgia Railway case," 6 where Mr. Justice Brandeis spoke for
the Court, the rates were sustained, because unlike the Southwestern
Bell Telephone and Bluefield cases, the rates set by the commission did yield
a fair return upon actual investment of about 7% per cent. though only 4
per cent. on reproduction value as shown by the company.
Considering these cases together, the conclusion is that although a
majority of the court leans towards the reproduction theory of public utility valuation, the court will hesitate to declare specific rates confiscatory and
unconstitutional if they bring a fair return on actual investment, notwithstanding a much higher reproduction cost.
The clearest indication, prior to the Baltimore Street Railway case, and
the O'Fallon case, of the Court's preference for the reproduction theory of
valuation, is Mr. Justice Butler's opinion in McCardle v. Indianapolis Water
CompanyY And the Court's opinion in that case evoked from Mr. Justice
Brandeis a flat denial that any statement had been made by the Court? to the
effect "that value is tantamount to reproduction cost". s
One of the main points on which the Court divided in the Baltimore
Street Railways case,' 9 was depreciation. The Maryland Public Service
Commission, in fixing a rate of fare, agreed that depreciation be reckoned
on the cost of the thing depreciated and not on present value. The Maryland Court of -Appeals held this erroneous; that depreciation should have
been reckoned on present value. This decision, the Supreme Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Sutherland held was "plainly right"; that "It is the
Georgia Ry. & Power Co. v. Railroad Commission, 262 U. S. 625, 43 Sup. Ct. 68o
(1923).

W272 U. S. 400, 47 Sup. Ct. 144 (1926).

'Ibid. at 423, 47 Sup. Ct. at 153.
"Nor do I find," Mr. Justice Brandeis continues, "in the decisions of this Court any support for the view that a peculiar sanction attaches to 'spot' reproduction cost, as distinguished
from the amount that it would actually cost to reproduce the plant if that task were undertaken at the date of the hearing. 'Spot' reproduction would be impossible of accomplishment
without the aid of Aladdin's lamp. The actual cost of a plant may conceivably indicate its
actual value at the time of completion or at some time thereafter. Estimates of cost may
conceivably approximate what the cost of reproduction would be at a given time. But where
a plant would require years for completion, the estimate would be necessarily delusive if it
were based on 'spot' prices of labor, materials and money. The estimate, to be in any way
worthy of trust, must be based on a consideration of the varying costs of labor, materials, and
money for a period at least as long as would be required to construct the plant and put it
into operation. Moreover, the estimate must be made in the light of a longer experience and
with due allowances for the hazards which attend all prophesies in respect to prices. The
search for value can hardly be aided by a hypothetical estimate of the cost of replacing the
plant at a particular moment, when actual reproduction would require a period that must be
measured by years." Ibid.
9 United Railways & Elec. Co. v. West, 280 U. S. 234, 50 Sup. Ct. 123 (1930).
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settled rule of this Court that the rate base is present value, and it would
be wholly illogical to adopt a different rule for depreciation." 100
To this ruling Mr. Justice Brandeis made vigorous dissent. He
thought "A net return of 6.26 per cent. upon the present value of the property of a street railway enjoying a monopoly in one of the oldest, largest
and richest cities on the Atlantic Seaboard would seem to be compensatory." 101 The difference between the depreciation charges originally allowed by the Commission and those computed on the basis of present
value, amounted to $755,166 annually, and if this item were eliminated
from the operating costs of the company and applied against the rate base
of $70,000,000 it would add 1.o8 per cent. to the estimated return. He
insisted that this should have been done.
..
. acceptance of the doctrine of Smyth v. Ames does not require
that the depreciation charge be based on present value of plant. For,
an annual detleciation charge is not a measure of the actual consumption of plant during the year. No such measure has yet been invented.
There is no regularity in the development of depreciation. It does
not proceed in accordance with any mathematical law. There is nothing in business experience, or in the training of e) perts, which enables
man to say to what extent service life will be impaired by the operations of a single year, or of a series of years less than the service
life." 102

Mr. justice Brandeis' study of the economics of insurance had shown
him how legal science could solve this intricate economic problem of depredation:
"The depreciation charge is frequently likened to the annual premium in legal reserve life insurance. The life insurance premium is
calculated on an agreed value of the human life--comparable to the
known cost of plant-not on a fluctuating value, unknown and unknowable. The field of life insurance presented a problem comparable
to that here involved. Despite the large experience embodied in the
standard mortality tables and the relative simplicity of the problem
there presented, the actual mortality was found to vary so widely from
that for which the premiums had provided, that their rates was found
to work serious injustice either to the insurer or to the insured. The
transaction resulted sometimes in bankruptcy of the insurer; sometimes in his securing profits which were extortionate; and rarely, in his
receiving only the intended fair compensation for the service rendered.
Because every attempt to approximate more nearly the amount of premium required proved futile, justice was sought and found in the
system of strictly mutual insurance. Under that system the premium
charged is made clearly ample; and the part which proves not to have
been needed enures in some form of benefit to him who paid it.
Ibid. at 254, 5o Sup. Ct. at 126.
Ibid. at 255, 50 Sup. Ct. at 127.
: Ibid. at 262, 5o Sup. Ct. at 129.
1

'o
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"Similarly, if, instead of applying the rule of Smyth v. Ames, the
rate base of a utility were fixed at the amount prudently invested, the
inevitable errors incident to estimating service life and net expense in
plant consumption could never result in injustice either to the utility
or to the community. For, if the amount set aside for depreciation
proved inadequate and investment of new capital became necessary,
the utility would be permitted to earn a return on the new capital. And
if the amount set aside for depreciation proved to be excessive, the
income from the surplus reserve would operate as a credit to reduce
the capital charge which the rates must earn. If the Railways should
ever suffer injustice from adopting cost of plant as the basis for calculating the depreciation charge, it will be an unavoidable incident of
applying in valuation the rule of Smyth. v. Ames." 103
Nor does his claim that the depreciation charge should be based upon
the cost of the property, rather than upon present value, rest upon reason
alone. This is the method adopted by the United States ,Chamber of Commerce; 104 it is the practice of public accountants; 105 it is supported by
leading business institutions; '° it conforms to the policy of utility com0
missions.1 T
On all these points Mr. Justice Brandeis had ample support. He cites
many authorities, but not court decisions and legal treatises. Footnotes,
covering several pages, include references to hundreds of authorities-studies in economics and in political science, studies of the practices of admininstrative bodies, of trade associations and private corporations, works on
accountancy, and more.
'Ibid.

at 278,.5o Sup. Ct. at I3.5. See also his dissenting opinion in Pacific Gas & Elec.

Co. v. San Francisco, 265 U. S.403, 44 Sup. Ct. 537

(1924).

' "The business device known as the depreciation charge appears not to have been 'widely

adopted in America until after the beginning of this century

Its use is still stoutly resisted

by many concerns. Wherever adopted, the depreciation charge is based on the original cost
of the plant to the owner. When the great changes in price levels incident to the World War
led some to question the wisdom of the practice of basing the charge on original cost, the
Chamber of Commerce of the United States warned business men against the fallacy of departing from the accepted basis. And that warning has been recently repeated." United
Railways & Elec. Co. v. West, supra note go, at 265, 50 Sup. Ct. at 13o.
" "Such is today, and ever has been, the practice of public accountants. Their statements
are prepared in accordance with principles of accounting which are well established, generally
accepted and uniformly applied. By those accustomed to read the language of accounting a
depreciation charge is understood as meaning the appropriate contribution for that year to the
amount required to make good the cost of the plant which ultimately must be retired." Ibid.
at 267, 50 Sup. Ct. at 131.
' "Business men naturally took the plant at cost, as that is how they treat other articles
consumed in operation. The plant, undepreciated, is commonly carried on the books at cost:
and it is retired at cost. . . . they realized also that to attempt to make the depreciation
account reflect economic conditions and changes would entail entry upon new fields of conjecture and prophecy which would defeat its purposes. For there is no basis in experience which
can justify predicting whether a replacement, renewal or substitution falling in some future
year will cost more or less than it would at present, or more or less than the unit cost when
it was acquired. . . . In 1927 the business men's practice of basing the depreciation charge
on cost was applied by this Court in United States v. Ludey, 274 U. S. 295, 300-301." Ibid.
at 269, 270, 274, 50 Sup. Ct. at 132, 134.
' "A depreciation charge based on original cost has been uniformly applied by the public
utility commissions of the several States when determining net income, past or expected, for
rate-making purposes." Ibid. at 273, 50 Sup. Ct. at 133.
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It is now established that the rule for determining the rate base is present value; that original cost is not present value or an approximation thereof;
that substantial weight must be given to present costs of labor and materials
and therefore to increased reproduction cost. Mr. Justice Brandeis has never
been willing to admit that the rule enunciated in the Smyth case justifies any
such conclusion. He still insists that if the court allowed actual cost as the
rate base much of the difficulty with reference to the determination of reasonable rates and depreciation allowances would be avoided. He urges this
rule because he understands that the use of either reproduction cost or present
value is quite as likely, through the fluctuation of values, to operate at one
period against the public and in favor of the utilities at another period against
the utilities and in favor of the public.108 He sees in the adoption of original
cost the only means of securing a stable and practicable base for steady use in
rate case adjudications.
Political and Industrial Liberty
It is evident from the preceding pages that Mr. Justice Brandeis values
human rights as more basically important to society than property rights.
It necessarily follows, as to the political aspect, that the State exists for
man. Man does not exist for the State. The worth of the State is in what
it wins for man:
"Those who won our independence believed that the final end of
the state was to make men free to develop their faculties; and that in
its government the deliberative forces should prevail over the arbitrary.
They valued liberty both as an end and as a means. They believed
liberty to be the secret of happiness and courage to be the secret of
liberty. They believed that freedom to think as you will and to speak
as you think are means indispensable to the discovery and spread of
political truth." 109

"The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions
favorable to the pursuit of happiness. They recognized the significance
of man's spiritual nature, of his feelings and of his intellect. They
knew that only a part of the pain, pleasure and satisfactions of life
are to be found in material things. They sought to protect Americans
in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their sensations.
They conferred, as against the Government, the right to be let alone
-the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men." 110

Nevertheless, Mr. Justice Brandeis' principles exhibit an element of
collectivism so strong as somewhat to embarrass those who heartily endorse
""For illustrations of the effect of using reproduction cost among the "relevant facts" to
be taken into account in determining fair value, see GLAESER, OUTLINES OF PUBLIC UTILTY
EcoNoMIcs (x927) 462 et seq. and authorities cited. For an able discussion of the public
utility cases, see Bauer, Decisions on Valuation and Rate Making, AmERMCAN EcoNomic REv.,
June, 1924.
Whitney v. California, 274 U. S. 357 at 375, 47 Sup. Ct. 641 at 648 (1927).
"o Olmstead v. United States, :77 U. S. 438 at 478, 48 Sup. Ct. 564 at 572 (1928).
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his libertarian doctrines. The political system, as well as the industrial
and social, should be directed, he contends, not so much toward material
progress as for the development of men. "Our business is not to make
goods, but to make men." "' "I cannot believe", Mr. Justice Brandeis observed, "that the liberty guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment includes
only liberty to acquire and enjoy property." 112 The reason he feels "such
an interest in scientific management, is that it does tend to make men"." 3
He opposes long hours of labor and big industrial combinations, 114 restrictions on freedom of speech and assembly, because these dwarf the individual. He favors trade unions, the minimum wage, the Volstead Act, workmen's compensation and unemployment insurance chiefly on the score of
their tendency to favor individual development. His implicit faith in democracy,"' industrial and political, is rooted in the belief that it alone
affords the conditions under which an individual is free to develop his
powers:
"We must bear in mind all the time that however much we may
desire material improvement and must desire it for the comfort of the
individual, the United States is a democracy, and that we must have,
above all things, men. It is the development of manhood to which any
industrial and social system should be directed. We Americans are
committed not only to social justice in the sense of avoiding things
which bring suffering and harm, like unjust distribution of wealth;
but we are committed primarily to democracy. The social justice for
which we are striving is an incident of our democracy, not the main
end. It is rather the result of democracy-perhaps its finest expression-but it rests upon democracy, which implies the rule by the people . - . And that involves industrial democracy as well as political
democracy." 16
" Testimony before Commission on Industrial Relations. 64th Cong., Ist Sess.

I9 SEN.

Doc. IOO3 (915).

' Gilbert v. Minnesota, 254 U. S. 325 at 343, 41 Sup. Ct. 125 at 131 (192o) (dissent).
Brandeis, Organized Labor and Efficiency, szapra note 7, at 149. "Conserving human
effort, and the man, is the fundamental tenet of scientific management."
"To my mind the best game that there is is the game of work, and I want to see men in
it for all the joys that come with working effectively". Testimony before Commission on
Industrial Relations, loc. sit. sitpra note III.
"'For a discussion of the incompatibility between big business and industrial democracy
see Statement before the Commission on Industrial Relations, supra note 65, at 7659.
"We cannot maintain democratic conditions in America if we allow organizations to arise
in our midst with the power of the Steel Corporation. Liberty of the American citizen can
not endure against such organizations." Hearings before the Committee on Investigation of
United States Steel Corporation (1912) 2862. Mr. Brandeis compares the condition of the
worker under the present industrial system with that under the servile system of a century
ago. Ibid. 2842 et seq.
10 "I have such a faith in democracy and such a distrust of the absence of it that I have
felt a grave apprehension as to what might ultimately be the effect of these foundations
[Rockefeller and Russell Sage] when the control shall have passed out of the hands of those
who at present are administering them to those who may not be governed by the excellent
1

intent of the creators."

65, at 7664.

Statement before the Committee on Industrial Relations, supra note

"I think we need democracy at all times no matter what the system is under which we
work." Testimony before Commission on Industrial Relations, supra note III, at 999.
n, Statement before the Commission on Industrial Relations, supra note 65, at 7659-7660.
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Like John Stuart Mill, Mr. justice Brandeis feels sure that unless men
are allowed to speak and write freely they will cease to develop at all. He
accordingly held that a state is, ordinarily, denied the power to prohibit dissemination of social, economic and political doctrine which a vast majority
of its citizens believes to be false and fraught with evil consequence: "To
justify suppression of free speech there must be reasonable ground to fear
that serious evil will result if free speech is practiced. There must be reasonable ground to believe that the danger apprehended is imminent. There
must be reasonable ground to believe that the evil to be prevented is a serious
one." 11" Thus for Brandeis, as for Mill, the rights of others alone can
place justifiable restrictions upon liberty: "All rights are derived from the
purposes of society in which they exist, above all rights rises duty to the
community." lls
An exponent of laissez faire in the sphere of politics, he is an ardent
advocate of government regulation in the sphere of industry. Both liberty
and democracy are seriously threatened by the growth of big business. Today the need is not so much for freedom from physical restraint as for freedom from economic oppression:
"Already the displacement of the small independent business man
by the huge corporation with its myriad of employees, its absentee
ownership, and its financier control, presents a grave danger to our
democracy. The social loss is great; and there is no economic gain." 119
"Politically, the American workman is free-so far as law can
make him. But is he really free? Can any man be really free who
is constantly in danger of becoming dependant for mere subsistence
upon somebody and something else than his own exertion and conduct?
Men are not free while financially dependent upon the will of other
individuals. Financial dependence is consistent with freedom only
where claim to support rests upon right, and not upon favor." 120
Political liberty, then, is not enough; it must be attended by economic
and industrial liberty. Trade unions have done much, but Mr. Justice
Brandeis insists that if the individual is to be really free from all modern
forms of economic oppression, government itself must intervene,' 2 regu'Whitney v. California, supra note io9, at 376, 47 Sup. Ct. 648.
Duplex Printing Co. v. Deering, supra note 22.
"The liberty of each individual must be limited in such a way that it leaves others the
possibility of individual liberty; the right to develop must be subject to that limitation which
gives everybody else the right to develop; the restriction is merely an adjustment of the relations of one individual to another." Testimony before New York State Factory Investigating
Commission, January 22, 1915.
Cutthroat Prices,HARPER'S WEEKLY, Nov. 15, 1913, at 12.
oBrandeis, The Road to Social Eficiency, supra note 7.
'Various observations by him as to industrial democracy suggest that Mr. Brandeis
would sympathize with certain aspects of guild socialist theory:

"The end for which we must strive is the attainment of rule by the people, and that

involves industrial democracy as well as political democracy. That means that the problems
of a trade should no longer be the problems of the employer alone. The problems of his
business, and it is not the employer's business alone, are the problems of all in it. The union

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

lating large business combinations and maintaining rational competition
between small units.
If the common man is to secure even approximately equal bargaining
power with capital, he must cooperate with his fellows. Every legal and
practical encouragement should be given to develop cooperatives among
farmers and industrial workers. So when the Oklahoma Act of 1919 for
organizing cooperatives among farmers was found wanting as a denial of
equal protection of the laws, Mr. justice Brandeis dissented. He saw in
the statute the purpose to secure economic democracy:
"The assertion is that co-operatives organized under the law of
1919, being stock companies, do business with the general public for

the sole purpose of making money, as do individual or other corporate
competitors; whereas co-operatives organized under the law of 1917
are 'for mutual help, without capital stock, not conducted for profit,
and restricted to the business of their own members.' The fact is that
these two types of co-operative corporations-the stock and the nonstock--differ from one another only in a few details, which are without significance in this connection; that both are instrumentalities commonly employed to promote and effect co-operation among farmers;
that the two serve the same purpose: and that both differ vitally from
commercial corporations. The farmers seek through both to secure
a more efficient system of production and distribution and a more equitable allocation of benefits. But this is not their only purpose. Besides promoting the financial advantage of the participating farmers,
they seek through co-operation to socialize their interests-to require
an equitable assumption of responsibilities while assuring an equitable
distribution of benefits. Their aim is economic democracy on lines
of liberty, equality and fraternity. To accomplish these objectives,
both types of co-operative corporations provide for excluding capitalist
control. As means to this end, both provide for restriction of voting
privileges, for curtailment of return on capital and for distribution of
gains or savings through patronage dividends or equivalent devices." 122
In this modern industrial era property may, as is well known, be used
in such a way as to interfere "with that fundamental freedom of life for
which property is only a means". Where such interference occurs Mr. Juscannot shift upon the employer the responsibility for conditions, nor can the employer insist
upon determining, according to his will, the conditions which shall exist. The problems which
exist are the problems of the trade; they are the problems of the employer and the employee.
. . . There must be a division, not only of profits, but a division also of responsibilities.
The employees must have the opportunity of participating in the decision as to what shall be
their condition and how the business shall be run . .. And if the situation is such that a
voluntary organization like a labor union is powerless to bring about the democratization of
a business, I think we have in this fact some proof that the employing organization is larger
than is consistent with the public interest. .... And the state must in some way come to the
aid of the workingmen if democratization is to be secured." Statement before the Commission
on Industrial Relations, supra note 65, at 7662 et seq.
'2Frost v. Corporation Commission, 278 U. S. 515 at 536, 49 Sup. Ct. 235 at 243 (1929).
In Corporation Commission of Okla. v. Lowe, 281 U. S. 431, 50 Sup. Ct. 397 (ig3o), a case
involving facts very similar to those in the Frost case, a unanimous court reached a decision
in conformity to the views of Mr. Justice Brandeis.
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tice Brandeis, ever watchful of human rights, insists that it should be controlled: "Regulation of railroads and public utilities, trusts and all big industries that control the necessities of life, far from being infringements on
liberty, are in reality protections against infringements on liberty." 123
His appreciation of government regulation as guarding against the
dangers inherent in trusts and monopolies, did not, however, commit him
to such strict interpretation of the anti-trust laws as would render it legally
impossible for business to rationalize its methods of competition. "The
Sherman Law", he argued, "does not prohibit every lessening of competition; and it certainly does not command that competition shall be pursued
blindly, that business rivals shall remain ignorant of trade facts or be denied aid in weighing their significance." 124 Just as the trade union is a
necessary instrument for securing among workers higher wages, better
hours and proper working conditions, so the trade association represents a
"commendable effort by concerns engaged in a chaotic industry to make
possible its intelligent conduct under competitive conditions". 125 So when
the Sherman Act (originally intended to secure free competition) becomes
the instrument by which the small competitor is destroyed, Mr. Justice
Brandeis feels called upon to dissent:
"The cobperation which is incident to this Plan [open competition] does not suppress competition. On the contrary it tends to promote all in competition which is desirable. By substituting knowledge
for ignorance, rumor, guess and suspicion, it tends also to substitute
research and reasoning for gambling and piracy, without closing the
door to adventure or lessening the value of prophetic wisdom. In
making such knowledge available to the smallest concern it creates
among producers equality of opportunity. In making it available also
to purchasers and the general public, it does all that can actually be done
to protect the community from extortion. . .
"The refusal to permit a multitude of small rivals to co-operate,
as they have done here, in order to protect themselves and the public
from the chaos and havoc wrought in their trade by ignorance, may
result in suppressing competition in the hardwood industry. These
keen business rivals, who sought through cooperative exchange of trade
information to create conditions under which alone rational competition is possible, produce in the aggregate about one-third of the hardwood lumber of the country. This court held in United States v. U. S.
Steel Corporation, 251 U. S. 417, that it was not unlawful to vest in

a single corporation control of 50 per cent. of the steel industry of the
country; and in United States v. United Shoe M11achinery Co., 247
U. S. 32, the court held that it was not unlawful to vest in a single
corporation control of practically the whole shoe machinery industry.
Poole, Brandeis (1911) 71 AMERICAN MAGAZINE 481 at 492.
-"American Column & Lumber Co. v. United States, 2.57 U.
114 at 122 (1921).

'5Ibid. at 418,

42 Sup.

Ct. at 123.

S. 377 at

415, 42

Sup. Ct.
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May not these hardwood lumber concerns, frustrated in their efforts
to rationalize competition, be led to enter the inviting field of consolidation? And if they do, may not another huge trust with highly centralized control over vast resources, natural, manufacturing and financial, become so powerful as to dominate competitors, wholesalers, retailers, consumers, employees and, in large measure, the community?" 1201
The preference, already cited, for small business units as against the
power of combined capital is illustrated also in Mr. Brandeis' dissenting
opinion in the Quaker City Cab case. The Philadelphia cab corporations
objected to a Pennsylvania taxing statute on the ground that competitive
individuals and partnerships were not subject to the tax imposed. The
Court in a six to three decision declared the statute unconstitutional under
the "equal protection" clause. The classification, the Court held, to be legitimate, "must be based on a real and substantial difference having reasonable
relation to the subject of the legislation". The Court felt there was no
such difference. Mr. Justice Brandeis wrote in dissent:
"In Pennsylvania the practice of imposing heavier burdens upon
corporations dates from a time when there, as elsewhere in America,
the fear of growing corporate power was common. The present heavier imposition may be a survival of an early effort to discourage the*
resort to that form of organization. The apprehension is now less
common. But there are still intelligent, informed, just-minded and
civilized persons who believe that the rapidly growing aggregation of
capital through corporations constitutes an insidious menace to the
'Ibid. at 418. 42 Sup. Ct. at 123. See also United States v. American Linseed Oil Co.,
262 U. S. 371, 43 Sup. Ct. 6o7 (1922).
As a result of the court's decisions in these cases, the opinion gained currency among
both lawyers and laymen that the mere collection and dissemination of statistical information
is unlawful. But by the time the Cement (Cement Mf'rs Protective Ass'n v. United States,
268 U. S. .88, 45 Sup. Ct. 586 (192.5)) and Maple Flooring (infra) cases came on for decision, the personnel of the court had changed. The most significant addition was that of
Mr. Justice Stone, an able lawyer and a trained economist. So in these cases we find Justices
Brandeis and Holmes on the side of the majority with Justice McReynolds, who had spoken
for the court in the American Lumber case, in the minority. Elaborating the economic viewpoint, so strongly insisted upon by Mr. Justice Brandeis in the American Lumber case, Mr.
Justice Stone observed:
"It is not, we think, open to question that the dissemination of pertinent information
concerning any trade or business tends to stabilize that trade or business and to produce uniformity of price and trade practice. Exchange of price quotations of market commodities
tends to produce uniformity of prices in the markets of the world. Knowledge of the supplies
of available merchandise tends to prevent over-production and to avoid the economic disturbances produced by business crises resulting from over-production. But the natural effect of
the acquisition of wider and more scientific knowledge of business conditions, on the minds of
the individuals engaged in commerce, and its consequent effect in stabilizing production and
price, can hardly be deemed a restraint of commerce or if so it cannot, we think, be said to
be an unreasonable restraint, or in any respect unlawful.
"It is the consensus of opinion of economists and of many of the most important agencies
of government that the public interest is served by the gathering and dissemination, in the
widest possible manner, of information with respect to the production and distribution, cost
and prices in actual sales, of market commodities, because the making available of such information tends to stabilize trade and industry, to produce fairer price levels and to avoid the
waste which inevitably attends the unintelligent conduct of economic enterprise." Maple
Flooring Ass'n v. United States, 268 U. S. 563 at 582, 45 Sup. Ct. 578 at 584 (925).

AIR. JUSTICE BRANDEIS AND THE CONSTITUTION

liberty of the citizen; that it tends to increase the subjection of labor
to capital; that, because of the guidance and control necessarily exercised by great corporations upon those engaged in business, individual
initiative is being impaired and creative power will be lessened; that
the absorption of capital by corporations, and their perpetual life, may
bring evils similar to those which attended mortmain; that the evils
incident to the accelerating absorption of business by corporations outweigh the benefits thereby secured; and that 'the process of absorption should be retarded."

127

Himself an expert in accountancy, he understands that the courts are
usually ill-equipped to deal with the technique of valuation, rate-fixing and
monopoly. Therefore he generally defers to the findings of the Interstate
Commerce Commission, 128 the Federal Trade Commission 120 and the var' Quaker City Cab Co. v. Pennsylvania,
(1928).
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U. S. 389 at 410, 48 Sup. Ct. 553 at 558

-= See United States v. Los Angeles and Salt Lake R. R., 273 U. S. 299, 47 Sup. Ct. 713
(1927) ; Great Northern Ry. v. Merchants Elevated Co., 259 U. S. 285, 42 Sup. Ct. 477
(1924).
The first case to come before the Court under the valuation clause of the Transportation
Act of 1920 is St. Louis & O'Fallon Ry. v. United States, 279 U. S. 461, 49 Sup. Ct. 384
Under paragraph four, section I5a, Congress had directed the Interstate Commerce
(1929).
Commission to give due consideration to all the elements of value recognized by the law of
the land for rate-making purposes. The Commission itself was divided as to the weight to
be given to reproduction cost. Without following any particular rule of valuation, the majority of the Comnmission found that "the value of the property of railroads for rate-making
purposes . . . approaches more nearly the reasonable and necessary investment in property
than the cost of reproducing it at a particular time." The majority of the court speaking
through Mr. justice McReynolds sided with the minority of the Commission, on the score
that insufficient weight had been given to the principle of reproduction cost.
Mr. Justice Brandeis voted to sustain the findings of the Commission. He argued that
"the single-sum values found by the Commission do not coincide either with the estimated
prudent investment or with the estimated reproduction cost. They are much nearer the estimated original cost of the property than they are to its estimated reproduction cost. But the
values found do not conform .to any formula"; that "the insertion in section i.sa of the provision that the Commission 'shall give to the property investment account of the carrier only
that consideration which under the law it is entitled to in establishing values for rate-making
purposes' and the rejection of other proposed measures of value, show that Congress intended
not to impose restrictions upon the discretion of the commission"; that "unless, therefore,
Congress required the Commission, not only to consider evidence of reconstruction cost in
ascertaining values for rate-making purposes under section 15a, but also to give in all cases
and in respect to all property, some weight to evidence of enhanced reconstruction cost, even
if that evidence was not inherently persuasive, the Commission was clearly authorized to
determine for itself to what extent, if any, weight should be given to the evidence; and its
findings should not be disturbed by the Court, unless it appears that there was an abuse of
discretion." At 541, 49 Sup. Ct. at 407.
21
"- In Federal Trade Commission v. Gratz, 253 U. S. 4 , 40 Sup. Ct. 572 (I92O), the
Court affirmed the judgment of the Circuit Court annulling an order of the'Commission that
a company desist from the practice of imposing upon purchasers a so-called "tying clause".
Arguing that the judgment of the Circuit Court should be overruled and that the order of
the Commission be sustained, Mr. justice Brandeis observed:
"The proceeding is . . . a novelty. It is a new device in administrative machinery,
introduced by Congress in the year 1914. in the hope thereby of remedying conditions in
business which a great majority of the American people regarded as menacing the general
welfare, and which for more than a generation'they had vainly attempted to remedy by the
. At 432, 40 Sup. Ct. at 576.
ordinary processes of law. .
"Instead of undertaking to defincl what practices should be deemed unfair, as had been
done in earlier legislation, the Act left the determination to the Commission. Experience with
existing laws had taught that definition, being necessarily rigid, would prove embarrassing
and, if rigorously applied, might involve great hardship. Methods of competition which
would be unfair in one industry, under certain circumstances, might, when adopted in another
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ous state public service commissions. 13 0

Nevertheless he holds that the

courts must be responsible for adjudicating the relation of these problems
to the general welfare. 3 '
Since certain untoward events in 1929 many competent observers are
disposed to agree with Mr. Justice Brandeis in the position he has held so
long: that size, per se, is a threat to the well-being of the modem economic
community against which government must ever be on its guard.
Strange as it may appear, Mr. Justice Brandeis' liberalism in matters
of economics and of political rights, is conspicuously absent from his opinions having to do with "moral" issues. Indeed, he has proved himself an
authoritarian, and even a paternalist as regards enforcement of the National Prohibition Amendment and the Volstead Act. When liquor interests attacked the validity of the "experiment noble in motive", the support
he had given pacifists, socialists and other radical liberals, was not forthcoming. In the case which allowed the federal government to put breweries
and distilleries out of business without any compensation whatever for the
destruction of their property, he delivered the opinion of the court; 132 he
also held that one conviction for possessing liquor and another conviction for
selling the same liquor did not violate the constitutional protection against
double jeopardy; 133 the year before he had upheld the government's right
to confiscate the motor car of an innocent owner simply because a guest
passenger had on his person a small flask of whiskey. 34 Later in the same
year he had sustained that section of the Volstead Act which prohibits,
inter alia, physicians from prescribing more than one pint of liquor to the
same patient within a period of ten days.' 33
industry, or even in the same industry under different circumstances, be entirely unobjectionable. Furthermore, an enumeration, however comprehensive, of existing methods of unfair
competition must necessarily soon prove incomplete, as with new conditions constantly arising
novel unfair methods would be devised and developed. In leaving to the Commission the
determination of the question whether the method of competition pursued in a particular case
was unfair, Congress followed the precedent which it had set a quarter of a century earlier,

when by the Act to Regulate Commerce it conferred upon the Interstate Commerce Commission power to determine whether a preference or advantage given to a shipper or locality
fell within the prohibition of an undue or unreasonable preference or advantage . . . Recognizing that the question whether a method of competitive practice was unfair would ordinarily
depend upon special facts, Congress imposed upon the Commission the duty of finding the
facts, and it declared that findings of fact so made (if duly supported by evidence) were to be
taken as final." At 436, 40 Sup. Ct. at 578.
' United Railways & Elec. Co. v. West, supra note 99 (dissenting) ; McCardle v. Indianapolis Water Co., supra note 97 (dissenting).
...
Mr. Justice Brandeis' contribution to the law of railroad regulation has recently been
ably treated by Henry Wolf Bikl6 in Mr. Justice Brandeis and the Regulation of Railroads
(1931) 45 HARV. L. RaV. 4.
2 Ruppert v. Caffey, 251 U. S. 264, 40 Sup. Ct. 141 (1920)
(Justices McReynolds, Day
and Van Devanter dissenting).
'"Albrecht v. United States, 273 U. S. 1,47 Sup. Ct. 25o (1927).
.3United States v. One Ford Coup6, 272 U. S. 321, 47 Sup. Ct. 1.54 (1926) (Justices
Butler, McReynolds and Sutherland dissenting). See also Van Oster v. Kansas, 272 U. S.
465, 47 Sup. Ct. 133 (1926).
"' Lambert v. Yellowley, 272 U. S. 581, 47 Sup. Ct. 210 (1926).
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One observes in these cases so complete a breakdown of his individualism (perhaps also of his practice of fact finding) that one may wonder
whether he had not forgotten for the moment his own words of warning:
in every extension
of governmental functions lurks a new
13
danger to civil liberty".
"Experience should teach us to be most on our guard to protect
liberty when the Government's purposes are beneficent. Men born to
freedom are naturally alert to repel invasion of their liberty by evilminded rulers. The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well-meaning but without understanding." 137
When it is remembered that these pregnant warnings were uttered,
respectively, one year before and two years after the liquor cases cited
above, the mystery deepens. For Brandeis, as for John Stuart Mill, liberty
comprises freedom of thought and feeling. But that additional tenet in
Mill's individualism which held that each person "is the proper guardian
of his own health, whether bodily or mental and spiritual",' 138 finds no sup-

port in Mr. Justice Brandeis' political philosophy. He could not subscribe
to the doctrine that "mankind are greater gainers by suffering each other
to live as seems good to themselves, than by compelling each to live as seems
good to the rest".' 39 Rather he believes that no small part of the function
of the law is to make men good. It may be said perhaps that in all these
cases he was but following a rule of decision which in his opinion was
calculated to procure the attainment of liberty through law; 140 he was following a principle voiced in earlier cases:
"In order to preserve the liberty and the property of the great
majority of the citizens of a state, rights of property and the liberty
of the individual must be remoulded, from time to time, to meet the
changing needs of society." 141

Thus his zeal for social justice and his belief in the genuine worth of
the individual, sometimes cause him to favor even drastic regulation of those
very liberties which many consider it the primary purpose of the bill of
rights to protect.
' United States ex rel. Democratic Pub. Co. v. Burleson, 255 U. S. 407 at 436, 41 Sup.
Ct. 352 at 363 (192).

' Olmstead v. United States, supra note iIO, at 479, 48 Sup. Ct. at 572.
MILL, O LBERTY AND OTHER ESSAYS (1926) 17. Even John Stuart Mill admits
that "despotism is a legitimate mode of government in dealing with barbarians, provided the
end be their improvement, and the means justified by actually effecting that end."( ) Ibid.

at 14.
'

Ibid.

"The great achievement of the English-speaking people is the attainment of liberty
through law." BRANDEiS, op. cit. supra note 12, at 330.
'Dissenting in Truax v. Corrigan, supra note 48, at 376, 4z Sup. Ct. at r46.
"'
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Conclusions
The views of Mr. Justice Brandeis, so long propounded in dissent, are
now coming into general acceptance. A few illustrations may be cited:
With regard to the limits of the constitutional function of judicial
review, particularly in due process cases, his theory has recently been pronounced by him as spokesman for the Court in the New Jersey Insurance
case. Herein he held that the presumption of constitutionality in favor of
legislation, clearly within the police power, must prevail "in the absence of
some factual foundation of record for overthrowing the statute". 1 42 The
burden of proof, therefore, is placed squarely on those who oppose the statute, not on the state that upholds it. This is reminiscent of the rule followed by the Court in the famous A]iunn case 143 more than fifty years
earlier,-a rule, it may be added, from which the Court has departed in a
number of important instances. By either placing the burden of proof upon
the state 14 for the justification of social legislation, or by the Court's mak" O'Gorman & Young v. Hartford Ins. Co., 282 U. S. 251 at 258, 51 Sup. Ct. 13o at 132
(931).
The same position is taken by Chief Justice Hughes in Corporation Commission of Okla.
v. Lowe, supra note 122, at 438, 50 Sup. Ct. at 399:
"It was incumbent upon the appellee in invoking the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment to show with convincing clarity that the law of the State created against him the discrimination of which he complained. An infraction of the constitutional provision is not to
be assumed. On the contrary, it is to be presumed that the State in enforcing its local policies
will conform its requirements to the Federal guarantees. Doubts on this point are to be
resolved in favor of, and not against, the State." Compare with Mr. Justice Hughes' opinion
in Price v. Illinois, 2.38 U. S. 446, 4.52, 35 Sup. Ct. 892, 89. (1915).
" "For our purposes we must assume that, if a state of facts could exist that would justify
such legislation, it actually did exist when the statute under consideration was passed. For
us the question is one of power, not of expediency." Munn v. Illinois, supra note 76, at 132.
As to the reasonableness of the rate the court declared: "For protection against abuses by
legislatures the people must resort to the polls, not to the courts." At 135.
. . . as it does not appear upon the face of the statute, or from any facts of which the
court must take judicial cognizance, that it infringes rights secured by the fundamental law,
the legislative determination of those questions is conclusive upon the courts. It is not a part
of their functions to conduct investigations of facts entering into questions of public policy
merely, and to sustain or frustrate the legislative will, embodied in statutes, as they may
happen to approve or disapprove its determination of such questions." Mr. Justice Harlan in
Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U. S. 678, 68.5, 8 Sup. Ct. 992 at 996 (1888). See also Atkin v.
Kansas, 191 U. S. 207, 222, 24 Sup. Ct. 124, 128 (1903).
'" As Mr. Justice Sutherland held in Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U. S. 525, 43 Sup.
Ct. 394 (1923) : ".. . freedom of contract is . . . the general rule and restraint the exception, and the exercise of legislative authority . . . can be justified only by the existence of
exceptional circumstances. Whether these circumstances exist in the present case constitutes
the question to be answered." At 546, 43 Sup. Ct. at 397.
Continuing he wrote:
"The feature of this statute which, perhaps more than any others, puts upon it the stamp
of invalidity is that it exacts from the employer an arbitrary payment for a purpose upon a
basis having no casual connection with his business, or the contract, or the work the employee
engages to do." At 558, 43 Sup. Ct. at 401.
Thus such facts as Mr. Frankfurter presented were, in Mr. Justice Sutherland's opinion,
entirely irrelevant. He said of them: "A mass of reports, opinions of special observers and
students of the subject, and the like, has been brought before us in support of this statement,
[that great benefit had resulted from the operation of minimum wage legislation] all of
which we have found interesting but only mildly persuasive. ...
"These are all proper enough for the consideration of law-making bodies, since their
tendency is to establish the desirability or undesirability of the legislation; but they reflect
no legitimate light upon the question of its validity; and that is what we are called upon to
decide. The elucidation of that question cannot be aided by counting heads." At S6o, 43
Sup. Ct. at

4o2.
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ing an investigation of facts such as is proper only for the legislature and
substituting its own findings for those of the legislature (as is the custom
of the more conservative judges),:"' the Court has hitherto found it possible to set aside legislation of great social and economic significance.
In the Railway Clerks' case 146 the Supreme Court went far toward
accepting Mr. Justice Brandeis' view that a labor union is entitled to extend
its operations beyond the bounds of a single enterprise. The Railway
Clerks' Union, to preserve its integrity, had secured an injunction against
the formation of a company union. A unanimous Court sustained that
order. The case is also especially noteworthy in that it demonstrated for
the first time, in a Supreme Court decision, the effectiveness with which
the injunction can be used by labor against employers.
In the recent decision in the Chain Store case, 14 7 the claims of industrial liberty, the right of the independent merchant and manufacturer
against the oppression of monopolistic combinations, triumphed and did so
on the basis of the principles insisted upon by Mr. Justice Brandeis in the •
148
Quaker City Cab case.

During the same term of Court, his conclusion, that "in frank expression of conflicting opinion lies the greatest promise of wisdom in gov9
ernmental action; and in suppression lies ordinarily the greatest peril",14
prevailed in the California Red Flag case. 10°
In the public utility field, economic events have already confirmed the
merit of his actual prudent investment theory of valuation, as against reproduction cost, which the Court has usually shown a tendency to favor.
With characteristic insight into economic cause and effect Mr. Justice Brandeis wrote in 1923: "The present price level may fall to that of 1914 within

a decade; and that, later, it may fall much lower." 151 With the fulfillment
of this prophecy, another shift of position between the protagonists is in
' As in Mr. Justice Butler's opinion in Jay Burns Baking Co. v. Bryan, slupra note 8.
"'Texas and N. 0. Ry. v. Brotherhood of Railway & Steamship Clerks, supra note 17.
'
State Board of Tax Commissioners v. Jackson, 283 U. S..527, 5I Sup. Ct. 540 (1931).
Quaker City Cab Co. v. Pennsylvania, supra note 127.
..Gilbert v. Minnesota, supra note 112, at 338, 41 Sup. Ct. at 129.
' Stronlberg v. California, 283 U. S. 359, 51 Sup. Ct. 532 (1931).

Delivering the opinion

of the Court, Chief Justice Hughes wrote:
"The maintenance of the opportunity for free political discussion to the end that government may be responsive to the will of the people and that changes may be obtained by lawful
means, an opportunity essential to the security of the Republic, is a fundamental principle of
our constitutional system. At 369, 51 Sup. Ct. at 536.
Ten years earlier Mr. Justice Brandeis had used much the same language in dissent:
"Like the course of the heavenly bodies, harmony in national life is a resultant of the
struggle between contending forces. In frank expression of conflicting opinion lies the
greatest promise of wisdom in governmental action; and in suppression lies ordinarily the
greatest peril."
'

Gilbert v. Minnesota, supra note 112, at 338, 41 Sup. Ct. at 129.

Southwestern & Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Serv. Co., supra note 85, at 303, 43 Sup. Ct.

551, n. 16.

See also Near v Minnesota, 283 U. S. 697, 51 Sup. Ct. 625 (1931) where the Court in a
five to four decision held unconstitutional the Minnesota "Gag Law" which made possible the
enjoining of any publication which, in the opinion of a single judge, was contrary to public
morals.

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

order, if the rule in the Smyth case is maintained, with the railroads and
public utilities on the side of investment cost and the consumer favoring
52
reproduction cost.1

Although usually coupled with Mr. Justice Holmes in any discussion
of Supreme Court personnel, Mr. Justice Brandeis differs singularly in judicial technique and in approach to questions of social policy. Mr. Justice
Holmes is generally called a liberal; although he himself has never, so far
as I know, pretended to be anything other than a constitutional skeptic.
Put in terms of political theory, Mr. Justice Holmes believes that the
sovereign people, speaking through their authorized agent-the legislaturecan, in general, embody their opinions in law; that there is nothing in the
Constitution to prevent their doing so. Therein he follows Hobbes. 3 Mr.
Justice Brandeis, however, believes that the legislature can embody popular
opinion in law only when such enactments conform with certain standards
of social justice. This recalls the "higher law" doctrine, and is somewhat
reminiscent of the views of Sir Edward Coke, who antedates Hobbes.
Therefore, to Mr. Justice Brandeis, judicial review of legislation involves
"weighing public needs as against private desires"; and also "weighing relative social values". Consequently he claims for the judiciary a larger share
in the exercise of sovereignty than Holmes seems disposed to allow. This,
roughly, is the main divergence of their lines of thought.
It follows that Mr. Justice Holmes' brand of liberalism differs fundamentally from that of Mr. Justice Brandeis.'
The latter becomes deeply
" Such a change of front is already in evidence. At the recent hearings in Washington
before the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, there were intimations
that some of the railway managers may once more look with favor on the theory of "original
investment". New York Times, Feb. 28, 1932.
' For evidence of Hobbes' influence, see Mr. Justice Holmes' references to THE LEVIATHAN in Heard v. Sturgis, 146 Mass. 545, 548-549, 16 N. E. 437, 441 (1888) ; In re Opinion
of the Justices, 16o Mass. 586 at 595, 36. N. E. 488 at 492 (1894) ; Kawanahakoa v. Polyblank, 2o5 U. S. 349 at 353, 27 Sup. Ct. 526 at 527 (1907). See also the very pertinent! observations of Elizabeth S. Sargeant, Justice Touched with Fire) reprinted in FRANKFURTER,
MR. JusTIcE HOLMES (1931) 186.
'A good illustration of the divergent viewpoints of the two justices is the case of Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon. 26o U. S. 393, 43 Sup. Ct. 1.58 (1922) where Mr. Justice Holmes
delivered the opinion of the Court and Mr. Justice Brandeis wrote a dissenting opinion.
When the legislatures of Nebraska and Iowa prohibited teaching German in the public
schools, Holmes' brand of liberalism, his willingness to allow the state to experiment even
though he did not agree, prompted him to uphold the legislation; Brandeis, on the other
hand, believing in liberty as an end as well as a means of achieving that which is most valuable
in human life, voted with the Court to overthrow the statute. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U. S.
390, 4.3 Sup. Ct. 62. (I923) ; Bartels v. Iowa, 262 U. S. 404, 43 Sup. Ct. 628 (I9"23). In the
Nebraska case Holmes' dissenting opinion was concurred in by Mr. Justice Sutherland-a
strange judicial bedfellow for one reputed to be a genuine liberal! Perhaps the best illustration of the dissimilar methods and viewpoints of the two justices is Truax v. Corrigan, supra
note 48. After reviewing at considerable length the application of the common law to the struggle between employers and employees in England and the United States, and after full "consideration of the contemporary conditions, social, industrial and political, of the community to be
affected", Mr. Justice Brandeis reaches the conclusion that the Arizona statute limiting the
remedy of injunction in disputes between capital and labor, is necessary and expedient as well
as constitutional.
Mr. Justice Holmes, in a much briefer opinion, and with no consideration of the points
stressed by Mr. Justice Brandeis, stated his reaction to the ruling of the Court by saying:
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concerned with economic and social maladjustments and the means of correction by legislative action, while Mr. Justice Holmes is likely to remain
cold and unmoved toward legislative and other panaceas. 5 Mr. Justice
Brandeis has demonstrated, both on and off the Bench, that he is a genuine
liberal. He is an avowed partisan of the common man; his special concern
is for those who are economically and financially dependent upon others for
a livelihood; he prefers human welfare to property rights. 56 Highly sensitive to present-day economic and social ills, he could never remain aloof
and indifferent as is the habit of Mr. Justice Holmes; he seeks the cause
of abuses and examines the merit of proposed remedies.
Counsel frequently fail to make such presentation of the case as satisfies him. So as a member of the Supreme Court, Mr. Justice Brandeis re"There is nothing that I more deprecate than the use of the Fourteenth Amendment
beyond the absolute compulsion of its words to prevent the making of social experiments that
an important part of the community desires, in the insulated chambers afforded by the several states, even though the experiments may seem futile or even noxious to me and to those
whose judgment I most respect" At 344, 42 Sup. Ct. at 134.
The following is a typical statement of Holmes' position: "I am far from saying that
I think this particular law a wise and rational provision. That is not my affair. But if the
people of the State of New York speaking by their authorized voice say that they want it, I
see nothing in the Constitution of the United States to prevent their having their will." Mr.
Justice Holmes dissenting in Tyson & Brothers v. Banton, 272 U. S.418 at 447, 47 Sup. Ct.
426 at 434 (I927). Dissenting in Lochner v. New York, 198 U. S. 45 at 76, 25 Sup. Ct. 539
at 546 (9o5) Mr. Justice Holmes wrote: "I strongly believe that my agreement or disagreement [with any particular economic theory] has nothing to do with the right of a majority to
embody their opinions in law."
For similar utterances, see his opinion in Noble Bank v. Haskell, 219 U. S. 1O4, 31 Sup.
Ct. i86 (1911) : Missouri. Kans. & Tex. Ry. v. May, 194 U. S. 267 at 27o, 24 Sup. Ct. 6.38
at 6.39 (19o4) : Block v. Hirsch, 2.6 U. S. 115 at 155, 41 Sup. Ct. 458 at 459 (1921) ; Otis v.

Parker, i87 U. S. 6o6 at 6o9, 23 Sup. Ct. 168 at 169 (19o3) ; Louisville & Nashville R. R. v.
Barber Asphalt Paving Co., 197 U. S. 430 at 435, 25 Sup. Ct. 466 at 467 (1905).

The position taken by Justice Holmes in these cases, regarding the leeway that should
be allowed the legislature, is entirely in accord with his earlier views:
"The first requirement of a sound body of law is that it should correspond with actual
feelings and demands of the community, whether right or wrong." HOLMES, THE CoMmox
LAW (1881)

41.

'"What proximate test of excellence [of good government] can be found except correspondence to the actual equilibrium of force in the community-that is, conformity to the
wishes of the dominant power? Of course, such conformity may lead to destruction, and it
isdesirable that the dominant power should be wise. But wise or not, the proximate test of
a good government is that the dominant power have its way."
PAPERS (1920) 258.

HOLMES, COLLECTED LEGAL

His position is further elaborated in the following: "I do not expect or think it desirable
that the judges should undertake to renovate the law . . .But I think it most important to
remember whenever a doubtful case arises, that what is really before us is a conflict between
two social desires,

.

. . the . . . question is which desire is strongest at the point of conflict.

. . . Where there is doubt the simple tool of logic does not suffice, and even if it is disguised
and unconscious, the judges are called on to exercise the sovereign prerogative of choice."
Law in Science and Science it Law (1899) 12 HARv. L. REv. 443, 460-461. Reprinted in
HOLmES, CoLLEcTED LEGAL PAPERS 2IO.

I His protest against the tendency of the Court to accord property greater protection
than liberty is pithily expressed as follows: "I have difficulty in believing that the liberty
guaranteed by the Constitution. which has been held to protect against state denial, the right
of an employer to discriminate against a workman because he is a member of a trade union
[Coppage v. Kansas, supra note i6] ; the right of a business man to conduct a private employment agency [Adams v. Tanner, supra note i] ; or to contract outside the state for insurance of
his property [Allgeyer v. Louisiana, i65 U. S.578, 589, 17 Sup. Ct. 427, 430 (1897)], although
the legislature deems it inimical to the public welfare, does not include liberty to teach, either
in the privacy of the home or publicly, the doctrine of pacifism: so long, at least, as Congress
has not declared that public safety demands its suppression." Gilbert v. Minnesota, supra
note 112. See also his dissenting opinion in the Bedford Cut Stone case, supra note 30.
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sorts to fact-finding agencies on his own account. He feels called upon to
make such investigation of the facts as enable him to decide whether the
provision in question is "so clearly arbitrary or capricious that legislators
acting reasonably could not have believed it to be necessary or appropriate
for the public welfare". 51 7 Mr. Justice Holrues feels no such responsibility.' " Not being addicted to the study of social and economic problems,' 59
Mr. Justice Holmes is likely to be rather skeptical of social projects., 0
Exactly the reverse is true of Mr. Justice Brandeis. Whether he happens
to be writing a brief or a judicial opinion, he is at heart a crusader."0 '
Never has he seen social and economic life as logical fictions carefully built
up by jurists. His reason for supporting any particular social enactment
may be and usually is, as he himself admits "partly legal, partly sentimental
and partly a recognition of economic rights and sound social policy". 1 2'
' Jay Burns Baking Co. v. Bryan, supra note 8, at 520, 44 Sup. Ct. at 416.
' "It may or may not be that if facts were called to our attention in a proper way the
objection would prove to be real. But even if, when called to our attention, the facts should
be taken notice of judicially, whether because they are only the premise for a general proposition of law rciting cases I or for any other reason, still there are many things that courts
would notice if brought before them that beforehand they do not know. It rests with counsel
to take the proper steps, and if thby deliberately omit thein, we do not feel called upon to,
institute inquiries on our own account." Mr. Justice Holmes, speaking for the Court in
Quong Wing v. Kirkendall, 223 U. S. 59 at 64, 32 Sup. Ct. 192 at 193 (1912). The italics
are the writer's. Yet in 1899, Mr. Holmes himself had written: "The true science of the law
does not consist mainly in a theological working out of dogma or a logical development as in
mathematics, or only in a study of it as an anthropological document from the outside; an
even more important part consists in the establishment of its postulates from within upon

accurately measured socigl desires instead of tradition."
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;25-226.

A point of view more in keeping with the earlier statement of Mr. Holmes is illustrated
in the following quotation from a dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Brandeis: "Much evidence
referred to by me is not in the record. Nor could it have been included. It is the history
of the experience gained under similar legislation, and the result of scientific experiments
made, since the entry of the judgment below. Of such events in our history, whether occurring!
before or after the enactment of the statute or of the entry of the judgment, the Court should
acquire knowledge, and must, in my opinion, take judicial notice, whenever required to perform the delicate judicial task here involved." Jay Burns Baking Co. v. Bryan, supra note
8, at 533, 44 Sup. Ct. at 421.
' Soon after taking his seat on the Supreme Court, Mr. Justice Brandeis impressed his
new associate, Mr. Justice Holmes, with the idea that "'a study of statistics would be good
for him'." Justice Holmes wa then leaving for his summer home at Beverly Farms and
so instructed Mr. Brandeis to "'pick ouf the right books and send them up'." The box of
books arrived in due course. An examination of the titles revealed a formidable array of
monographs and books on the eight-hour day, the textile industry, the employment of women,
employers' liability and so on. Gazing at the box in unaffected dismay, Mr. Justice Holmes
is said to have instructed a servant: "'Nail it up and send it back to him'." And then with
a sigh of relief the Justice immersed himself in Plato. (Related by Silas Bent in his recent
volume, JUsTc OLVER WENDELT HoraEs (1932) 280-281).
11""The social refornmers of today seem to me so far to forget that we . . . can[not] get
Probably I am too skeptical as to our ability to
something for nothing by legislation . ..
do more than shift disagreeable burdens from the shoulders of the stronger to those of the
The notion that with socialized property we should have women free and a
weaker. ....
But it is a pleasure to see more
piano for everybody seems to me an empty humbug ....
faith and enthusiasm in the young men; and I thought that one of them made a good answer
to some of my skeptical talk when he said, 'You would base legislation upon regrets rather
than upon hopes."' HOL IS, CoL..EcraED LEGAL PAPERS 305-307.
'm After discussing informally with Mr. Justice Brandeis the constitutional issues involved
in the California Criminal Syndicalism Statute of 1919, Mr. Justice Holmes) is said to have
remarked to his Secretary: "'I am! afraid Brandeis has the crusading spirit. He talks like
Related by Bent, loc. cit. supra note 159.
one of those upward-and-onward fellows'."
"' Statement before the Commission on Industrial Relations, supra note 65, at 7681.
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Another noteworthy characteristic of the judicial thinking of Mr.
justice Brandeis is the respect he pays legislative law, and his slight regard
for a "jurisprudence of concepts" which would keep both society and the law
in rigid and unchangeable form. The idea that law can be found but not
made, forms no part of his juristic philosophy. Although reordering the
law to bring it into accord with the ever-changing facts of life, is partly
the work of the Courts, it is more truly the function of the legislature. 1 63
This makes him slow to question the wisdom of the legislature's judgment.
Unlike his more conservative brethren, he has insisted that the law must
be made to look outside itself, if it is to cope adequately with problems
raised by a rapidly changing civilization. Thus he brings to .his consideration of the legislative product, not merely judicial precedents and decisions but committee reports, legislative debates and authoritative treatises
of various sorts, all hitherto almost entirely neglected in judicial opinions.
It follows that law for Mr. justice Brandeis is no mere embodiment of
an arbitrary set of a priori abstractions existing in a vacuum; rather, law
is essentially an instrument of social policy. Knowledge of it does not consist merely in the logical consistency of its rules. He emphasized time and
again the truth of the old maxim of the civilians-e.xr facto jus oritur. "No
law, written or unwritten, can be understood without a full knowledge of
the facts out of which it arises, and to which it is to be applied." 164
These words were written in 1916 shortly before he was appointed to
the Supreme Court. It is not surprising, then, that as a member of the
Court Mr. justice Brandeis continues his investigations of underlying facts.
His opinions are noteworthy and valuable if only for their references to
secular literature. 16
No significant contribution, whether from a legal,
social or economic point of view, escapes his attention. Elaborate docuwith the increasing complexity of society, the public interest tends to become
omnipresent; and the problems presented by new* demands for justice cease to be simple.
Then the creation or recognition by courts of a new private right may work serious injury to
the general public, unless the boundaries of the right are definitely established and wisely
guarded. In order to reconcile the new private right with the public interest, it may be
necessary to prescribe limitations and rules for its enjoyment; and also to provide administrative machinery for enforcing the rules. It is largely for this reason that, in the effort to
meet the many new demands for justice incident to a rapidly changing civilization, resort -to
legislation has latterly been had with increasing frequency." International News Serv. v.
Associated Press, 248 U. S. 215 at 262, 39 Sup. Ct. 68 at Si (1918).
"The fundamental right of free men to strive for better conditions through new legislation and new institutions will not be preserved, if efforts to secure it by argument to fellow
citizens may be construed as criminal incitement to disobey the existing law-merely because
the argument presented seems to those exercising judicial power to be unfair in its portrayal
of existing evils, mistaken in its assumptions, unsound in reasoning or intemperate in language." Pierce v. United States, 2.52 U. S. 2.39 at 273, 40 Sup. Ct. 205 at 217 (920).
See, in this connection, the excellent article by J. M. Landis, The Study, of Legislation in
the Law Schools, THE HARVARD GRADUATE MAGAZINE, June, 1931.
...
Brandeis, The Livhq Law (I916) 1o ILI. L. REv. 461 at 467.
"See especially his opinions in the following cases: Adams v. Tanner, supra note I;
Truax v. Corrigan, sura note 48: Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm., supra
note 8.5; New York Central R. R. v. Winfield, 244 U. S. 147, 37 Sup. Ct. .546 (1917) ; United
Railways & Electric Co. v. West, supra note 99, Jay Burns Baking Co. v. Bryan, supra note
8; St. Louis & O'Fallon Ry. v. United States, stepra note 128.
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mentation of all such material is made for the purpose of reaching a judicial
solution of the problem in hand. His studies have exposed as fictions numerous "assumptions upon which many American judges and lawyers had
rested comfortably". 166 His conviction that our individualistic philosophy
of rights and property could no longer furnish an adequate basis for dealing with the problem -of modern economic life has now become widespread.
It is now generally recognized that society has to have protection against
low wages, unemployment, industrial accidents, and other social and economic hardships, because society must ultimately bear the burden, financial
and otherwise, which these entail. Thus out of the attempt to enforce individual justice, Mr. Brandeis lays the foundations of social justice.
Fundamentally Mr. Justice Brandeis is an idealist, not always entirely
objective, seldom without liberal bias toward the social and economic questions that come before him. His vision is of an ideal state wherein tyranny,
political and industrial, is abolished; 167 he longs "for a truer democracy".' 0 s
Although preEminently a factualist, a stickler for statistics, he never
allows himself to be buried beneath the facts of modern industrial life. Particular emphasis should be given to the coherent and purposeful socialpolitical philosophy which underlies his profound factual knowledge. Never
is he forced "to improvise a theory, a philosophy, when confronted over
night by the exigencies of the case before him". 1" 9 With keen insight into
the "universal element" involved in the case before him, his decisions are in70
variably quickened "with the inspiration of a principle".1

Judicial interpretation cannot eliminate the personal bias of the interpreter. All men are more or less partisan. Emotions, great and small,
compel the judge to choose his side. When once that choice is made, historical events, social and economic facts, judicial precedents and philosophy, are
71
marshalled and emphasized in such a way as to bolster up his viewpoint.'
These observations are, I think, as applicable to Mr. Justice Brandeis as to
any other judge.1 72 Many years of study and of close contact with social and
73
economic affairs have developed in him certain emotional preferences.'
"

New York Central R. R. v. Winfield, supra note 165 at 165, 37 Sup. Ct. at 547.

These conclusions, in part, are confirmed in the recently published recollections of
William G. McAdoo:
"Brandeis is a humanitarian; an idealist, but not a dreamer, for no man living has a
firmer grasp of business or of economic actualities. He has an unusual capacity for looking
at civilization objectively, as if he were not a part of it and reducing its activities and results
to the common denominator of human welfare." McADoo, CROWDED YEARS (1931) 182.
' Brandeis, loc. cit. supranote 113.
CApDozo, THE GROWTH OF THE LAW (1924) 102.
'o Ibid.
l "The scrutiny and dissection of social facts may supply us with the data upon which
the creative spirit broods, but in the process of creation something' is given out in excess of
what is taken in." CARwozo, THE GROWTH OF THE LAW (1924) 90.
' He has usually shown himself unable to regard constitutional-social issues with that
cool detachment which is the unique characteristic of Mr. Justice Holmes.
'"' Nor is there any reason for concluding that this is not as it should be.
"Deep below consciousness are . . . the likes and the dislikes, the predilections and the
prejudices, the complex of instincts and emotions and habits and convictions, which make the
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Noting the continuity of Mr. Justice Brandeis' views before and after his
appointment, one is apt to feel that an ideal picture of society predetermines
74
his position as to many of the Court's decisions.'
And yet his contention that he has "no rigid social philosophy", is logical and natural enough because he is essentially a social scientist, for whom
problems are never solved but always in process of solution. New inventions, great emergencies and the like, give rise to new difficulties; a rule of
law once settled may have to yield later on to the impact of facts unforesee. "Modification implies growth. It is the life of the law." 175
The Constitution itself does not block that growth except when interpreted by minds too rigid and in an age of change.' 7 6 Then only does our
fundamental law prevent legislation from achieving the social and economic
ideal. Mr. Justice Brandeis understands that the Constitution must be
given liberal construction, if it is, as John Marshall once said, "to endure
for all ages to come, and, consequently, to be adapted to the various crises
in human affairs".'

77

!'Time works changes, brings into existence new conditions and
purposes. Therefore a principle to be vital must be capable of wider
application than the mischief which gave it birth. This is peculiarly
'true of constitutions. They are not ephemeral enactments, designed
to meet passing occasions." 178
" . .our social and industrial welfare demands that ample scope
should be given for social as well as mechanical invention. It is a
condition not only of progress but of conserving that which we have.
Nothing could be more revolutionary than to close the door to social
experimentation.

.

. .

And surely the federal Constitution-itself

perhaps the greatest of human experiments-does not prohibit [legislation reconciling] the existing industrial system with our striving for
social justice and the preservation of the race." 179
man, whether he be litigant or judge. . . . The great tides and currents which engulf the
rest of men, do not turn aside in their course, and pass the judges by." CARInozo, THE
NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1928) 167, and 167-i8o generally.

'A striking illustration of Mr. Justice Brandeis' sympathy with the viewpoint of labor
is the case of Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Industrial Relations, 267 U. S. 5.52, 4. Sup. Ct.
441 (1925), wherein the court set aside certain sections of the Kansas Court of Industrial

Relations Act. Strenuously opposed by labor, Mr. Justice Brandeis joined in the opinion of

Chief Justice Taft in overturning the act-an opinion which embodies one of the most conservative utterances that has issued from the Court in recent years.
'Washington

'1

v. Dawson & Co., supra note 47.

Such obstacles as there are exist not in the Constitution, but in the minds of those who

expound it:

"It [the Constitution] has not lost its capacity for expansion to meet new conditions,
unless it be interpreted by rigid minds which have no such capacity." Poole, op. cit. supra
note 123, at 493.
What Mr. Brandeis said in 1915 with particular reference to minimum wage legislation
is applicable to social legislation generally. See Brandeis, supra note 9, at 524.
' 'McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316 at 415 (U. S. ISI9).
x-Olmstead v. United States, supra note Iio, at 472, 48 Sup. Ct. at 570 (quoted from
Weems v. United States, 217 U. S. 349 at 373, 30 Sup. Ct. 544 at 55x (91o)).
' Brandeis, loc. ct. supra note 176. This point of view is reiterated in his most recent
judicial utterance (New State Ice Co. v. Liebman, decided March 21, 1932).
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Thus limitations "like those embodied in the due process clauses of
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, do not forbid the United States or
the states from meeting modern conditions by regulations which 'a century
ago, or even half a century ago, probably would have been rejected as arbitrary and oppressive'., 80 Clauses guaranteeing the individual protection
against specific abuses of power, must have a similar capacity of adaptation
to a changing world." S1 "There must be power in the states, and in the
nation to remould through experimentation our economic practises to meet
changing social and economic needs." 182
In considering Mr. Justice Brandeis' work on the Supreme Court, it
iscustomary to lay special stress upon his mastery of figures and statistics.' 8 3

But such analysis may lose sight of the fact that Mr. Justice Brandeis is a
social and political philosopher as well as a technician. He sees, as have
few of his generation, the social and economic perils of the industrial revolution; he understands that the development of the machine and of the business corporation, are threats to liberty and to the general welfare. To him
this means that we have "passed to a subtler civilization"; and therefore he
The main point of his disagreement with the Court is on its construction of the Fourteenth Amendment so as to restrict the states in their efforts to deal with free competition
and other problems of economics in "an emergency more serious than war".
"Economists are searching for the causes of this disorder and are re-examining the bases
of our industrial structure. Businessmen are seeking possible remedies. Most of them realize
that failure to distribute widely the profits of industry has been a prime cause of our present
plight. But, rightly or wrongly, many persons think that one of the major contributing
causes has been unbridled competition. Increasingly, doubt is expressed as to whether it is
econmically wise, or' morally right, that men should be permitted to add to the producing
facilities of an industry which is already suffering from overcapacity ...
"All agree that irregularity in employment-the greatest of our evils-cannot be overcome
unless production and consumption are more nearly balanced. Many insist there must be
some form of economic control ...
"I cannot believe that the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment, or the states which ratified it, intended to leave us helpless to correct the evils of technological unemployment and
excess productive capacity, which the march of invention and discovery have entailed.
"To stay experimentation within the law in things social and economic is a grave responsibility. Denial of the right to such experimentation may be fraught with serious consequences to the nation. It is one of thO happy incidents of the Federal system that a single
courageous state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory, and try novel social and
economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country. This court has the power to
stay such experimentation. We may strike down the statute embodying it on the ground that
in our opinion, it is arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable; for the due process clause has
been held applicable to matters of substantive law as well as to matters of procedure. But
in the exercise of this power, we should be ever on our guard, lest we erect our prejudices into
legal principles. If we would guide by the light of reason, we must let our minds be bold."

-New York Herald-Tribune,March

22, 1932.

"I Olmstead v. United States, supra note 1io, at 472, 48 Sup. Ct. at 570 (citing Euclid v.
Ambler Realty Co., 272 U. S. 36.5at 387, 47 Sup. Ct 114 at 118 (1926) ; Buck v. Bell, 274
U. S.m 200, 47 Sup. Ct. 584 (1927)).
Ibid.
State Ice Co. v. Liebman, supra note 179.
'New
"One writer, for example, in appraising the work of the Justice, found the following
observation of Mr. justice Holmes especially applicable to Mr. Justice Brandeis: "For the
rational study of the law the black-letter man may be the man of the present, but the man
of the future is the man of statistics and the master of economics." Bikl6, op. cit. supra note
131, at 32, quoting HOLMES, COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 187.
Norman Hapgood, also, in his preface to BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY (1914),
attributes Mr. Brandeis' success in various fields largely to his mastery of figures and of the
technical details of accounting.
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urges "the law must still protect a man from things that rob him of his
184
freedom, whether the oppressing force be physical or of a subtler kind".
The Justice emphasized the need for social intelligence. But he did more:
he studied some of the outstanding social and economic ills from which
society increasingly suffers. In these novel and creative activities Mr. Justice Brandeis has been dominated by a philosophy, an ideal, the vision of a
social and political structure within which the individual may best develop
a creative personality.
As a member of the Supreme Court, Mr. Justice Brandeis has been
and is significant because certain pre~minent qualities of mind enable him
to bring the law into vital relationship with the social possibilities of industry in our own day. He sees beyond the daily facts of economics and statistics to their basic social and economic consequences, to their philosophic
implication for the future."8 5 Methods of legal technique are not idols
but tools, tools serving the art of juristic philosophy and statesmanship.
Vast learning in the social sciences and a well-nigh unique mastery of current data are used merely as instruments of juristic thought., 8 6 Thus it is
that Mr. Justice Brandeis builds deep foundations for our law of days to
come.
x'Recorded by Ernest Poole in his interview with Mr. Brandeis, supra note 123, at 492.

Mr. Justice Brandeis possessed to an unusual degree that peculiar quality of mind
which, in the opinion of Justice Cardozo, judges so frequently lack:
"The judge is often left to improvise . . . a theory, a philosophy, when confronted over
night by the exigencies of the case before him. Often he fumbles about, feeling in a vague
way that some such problem is involved, but missing the universal element which would have
quickened his decision with the inspiration of a principle. If he lacks an adequate philosophy, he either goes astray altogether, or at best does not rise above the empiricism that
pronounces upon particulars." CARnozo, THE GROWTH OF THE LAw (1925) 102. "An
avalanche of decisions by tribunals great and small is producing a situation where citation of
precedent is tending to count for less, and appeal to an informing principle is tending to count
for more. . . . We shall be caught in the tentacles of the web, unless some superintending
mind imparts the secret of the structure, lifting us to a height where the unity of the circle
will be visible as it lies below." Ibid. 5-6. In an address on December 17, 1931, Judge Cardozco again made a strong plea for a "new philosophy in law that will guide the thought of
our successors when those of us in place today shall have vanished from the scene." New
York Times, Dec. 18, 1931.
Mr. Justice Holmes has emphasized the same point:
"Theory is the most important part of the dogma of the law, as the architect is the most
important man who takes part in the building of a house. The most important improvements
of the last twenty-five years are improvements in theory. It is not to be feared as impracticable, for, to the competent it simply means going to the bottom of the subject." HOLMES,
CoLIxmvcE LEGAL PAPERS 2OO. See also Holmes' introduction to THE CONTINENTAL LEGAL
'
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xlvi.

"The man of science in the law is not merely a bookworm. To a microscopic eye for
detail he must unite an insight which tells him what details are significant. Not every maker
ol exact investigation counts, but only he who directs his investigation to a crucial point."
I

HOLmES, COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 22U.

